Wednesday, 28 June 2023

China's youth unemployment situation could be far worse

 The current environment in China is far from conducive for university students to find a job, much less one that matches what they studied. Even if their finances allow and they embark on postgraduate studies, their employment prospects may not always improve when they finally enter the job market. It is not even a question of dropping one’s ego and accepting any job that comes along; structural challenges with the employment market may necessitate making hard decisions and exercising a lot of patience.

28 Jun 2023

Shanghai Correspondent, Lianhe Zaobao


Graduates of Wuhan University attend the graduation ceremony in Wuhan, in China's central Hubei province on 20 June 2023. (AFP)

On graduating this year, Jiang Wenxin, a voice major at an art school in Liaoning, made a decision that stunned his classmates: to work at Starbucks.

Some of Jiang’s fellow vocal music graduates chose to pursue postgraduate studies, while others took up teaching positions in education and training institutions. However, neither of these paths seemed ideal to him. “The tuition fees for music majors are too expensive, and my family cannot support me for further studies. The education and training industry has high entry barriers in big cities, while small cities offer low wages with no future for growth. So, why not find other jobs in a big city for now, and take it step by step?”

Currently, Jiang earns a monthly salary of 4,000 RMB (US$560) in Shanghai, which is barely enough to cover typical housing rents. Fortunately, he stays with relatives, saving him that part of his living expenses. The 23-year-old admitted that he even considered becoming a food delivery rider, but found that market already saturated. “The general climate is bad now, it’s really hard to find a job.”

Even students from prestigious universities feeling the pressure

Like Jiang, this year’s graduates spent a significant portion of their campus life amid lockdowns. They have just emerged from three years of the pandemic and are now facing the “most challenging job season” — a record-breaking 11.58 million fresh graduates are competing with previous graduates whose job searches were delayed due to the pandemic, all vying for a place in the first post-pandemic job market.

With the unprecedented surge in job demand and slow economic recovery, the competition for jobs is intense due to the supply-demand imbalance, and even students from prestigious universities are feeling the pressure.

Yu Min (pseudonym) studies at Tongji University, one of the top universities in Shanghai. However, the job search for this master’s degree student in environmental engineering has not been smooth. The increasing number of graduates each year has raised the recruitment threshold, and the “educational hierarchy” is obvious from the initial resume screening.

“When we send out resumes, they often go unanswered.” — Yu Min, Chinese youth

Yu explained that undergraduate and master’s students at “Double 9” universities (referring to the top 39 universities in China, known as the “985 Project” universities) usually receive the first batch of interview invitations. The second batch is for students with undergraduate degrees from “211 Project” universities (the top 115 universities in China) and master’s degrees from “985” universities.

Only after that does it come to candidates like Yu, who have undergraduate degrees from non-985 and non-211 universities, and master’s degrees from “985” universities. “Many large companies usually fill their positions in the second round, and state-owned enterprises often require ‘Double 9’ educational backgrounds,” she said. “When we send out resumes, they often go unanswered.”

After sending out 60 to 70 resumes, Yu Min finally managed to secure a job in a newly established state-owned enterprise. She said that this enterprise had lower educational requirements compared to traditional state-owned enterprises, which allowed her to “get through by luck”.

gaokao
Students leave after their first exam during the first day of the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE), known as “gaokao”, in Nanjing, in China's eastern Jiangsu province on 7 June 2023. (AFP)

Besides the “involution” or over-competition based on educational backgrounds, the fluctuating pandemic also created more obstacles for fresh graduates in their job search. Yu recalled that last year, the school remained closed for an extended period, making it difficult for employers to conduct on-campus recruitments, and students were unable to participate in off-campus internships. “I heard that friends in other cities were being accepted during their internships, or that companies were filling positions with people from other regions when they couldn’t recruit on-campus in Shanghai — everyone became anxious.”

... the three industries that used to provide over half of the job positions for fresh graduates — internet, education and training, and real estate — have seen a significant decline over the past three years.

 Private enterprise recruitment fell

The pandemic disrupted the job plans of university students and affected the main source of their employment — private enterprises.

According to data from the recruitment platform Zhaopin, while the class of 2022 were looking for jobs, recruitment by private enterprises for university students decreased by 20.3% compared to the previous year. Also, the number of active business users on the job-seeking website BOSS Zhipin decreased from 4.1 million in the first quarter of 2022 to 3.6 million by the end of the year, indicating that over 10% of businesses stopped or froze recruitment.

At the same time, the three industries that used to provide over half of the job positions for fresh graduates — internet, education and training, and real estate — have seen a significant decline over the past three years. Not only has the scale of recruitment noticeably decreased, but there have also been frequent cases of new graduates in these industries having their job offers revoked or being laid off.

According to a research report from the Development Research Center of the State Council of China, the resignation rate of 2020 and 2021 graduates from these three industries increased by 30% (internet), 30% (education and training), and 19% (real estate) respectively from July 2021 to May 2022.

The oversupply of university students and shortage of blue-collar workers has led to structural unemployment and limited the development of the Chinese economy.

Shortage of blue-collar workers

But even as university graduates struggle to find employment, some companies are fretting over a labour shortage.

Liu Chao, an anchor on the short video platform Kuaishou, said many new energy battery companies are currently recruiting employees with at least a high school education. “Although companies prefer employees with higher educational qualifications, few university students apply, as most are not willing to be blue-collar workers in factories.”


factory
Workers produce medical supplies that will be exported at a factory in Binzhou, in China's eastern Shandong province on 15 June 2023. (AFP)

The oversupply of university students and shortage of blue-collar workers has led to structural unemployment and limited the development of the Chinese economy. The Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security forecasts that by 2025, there will be a shortage of 30 million workers in the manufacturing industry.

Amid the severe job market, “Kong Yiji literature” became popular among young people, mocking how they are educated but cannot find a job. State media CCTV News published a commentary saying that Kong Yiji fell into difficulties because he could not drop the airs of a scholar, and was unwilling to change his situation through labour.

Economic growth is weak

Assistant Professor Lu Xi of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP) at the National University of Singapore said while there are structural reasons why it is difficult for university graduates to find jobs, it is not something that can be eased by simply “putting aside one’s ego”.

He said: “Many university graduates have already gone into ride-hailing and food delivery, quickly saturating the market. When they take jobs in factories and construction sites, the direct consequence is that the industry’s average wages are lowered due to increased supply.”

"...just work if they can, and not expect the situation to improve in the next two or three years." — Assistant Professor Lu Xi, LKYSPP

Prof Lu believes that the biggest problem in the current job market is weak economic growth and pessimistic investment expectations, which have led to insufficient demand on the supply side. In addition, the past three years of pandemic lockdowns have disrupted the pace of the job market, causing a large number of graduates to postpone entering the labour market. The backlog of employment demands is expected to continue for a long time, with a concentrated outbreak starting this year.

“If I had to give advice to today’s university students, it would be to just work if they can, and not expect the situation to improve in the next two or three years.”

graph 1
Graph showing the increasing number of tertiary graduates with new hires gradually falling across China. *12 million is the government's target for new hires for 2023. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (Graphic: Jace Yip)

Jiang Wenxin lamented that everyone used to pursue undergraduate degrees with great enthusiasm, only to realise after graduation that university graduates are not valued. If given a chance to start over, he would even consider attending a vocational school to learn a skill.

Changing the topic, he said: “But I have made it into what is considered a large company. As long as I work hard, there will be opportunities for me to be promoted to store manager or regional manager in the future. Unlike those classmates who are still hesitating, at least I have taken off Kong Yiji’s robe and put aside my ego.”

Just last year, a record 800,000 more people sat for the postgraduate examination than the previous year.

More postgraduate candidates

Shi Guandi first applied for a master’s degree at the end of last year. Alas, she contracted Covid during the first infection wave after China lifted its stringent measures. Thus, she did not get admitted to her desired college and major. Her parents told her "not to worry about the finances" and encouraged her to follow her dreams, whether it was to study or to work.

Graduates like Shi who can do a full-time master’s degree mostly have affluent backgrounds. Peking University’s 2021 graduate employment report showed that more than 60% of the graduates “waiting for employment” were from families of middle income or higher. Adequate family support and the competitive employment situation have led to greater numbers of graduates applying for graduate school.

According to statistics from the Ministry of Education, between 2005 and 2016, the number of postgraduate candidates increased by an average of 50,000 per year. However, since 2017, the figure has been increasing by an annual average of nearly 500,000. Just last year, a record 800,000 more people sat for the postgraduate examination than the previous year.

The influx of postgraduate candidates could not be accommodated even with the higher education institutions expanding their intake — postgraduate acceptance rates fell from 36% in 2018 to 27% in 2022.

Source: China's Ministry of Education (Graphic: Jace Yip)
Source: China's Ministry of Education (Graphic: Jace Yip)

Zhuo Xian, vice-department director at the Development Research Center of the State Council, wrote in an article last year that China’s "postgraduate and civil servant fever" has delayed nearly 5 million college students from getting employed.

Taking the graduating class of 2022 for example, to focus on preparing for the postgraduate examination, 54.6% of fresh college graduates only started sending out their resumes in January 2022, missing out on the “golden period” for job hunting before the Chinese New Year. As a result, their success rate in landing a job was 34 percentage points lower than other fresh graduates who started their job searches half a year earlier.

However, even if graduates successfully enrol in a master’s programme, they are just postponing their “employment anxiety” for another few years. When the pandemic first hit China in 2020, Chinese colleges significantly increased their postgraduate intake by nearly 190,000. But these highly educated youths did not expect employment prospects to worsen three years later.

Depreciating value of a degree

Luo, a PhD candidate studying meteorology at a university in Gansu, enrolled in a master’s programme in 2018 and then continued pursuing a doctorate degree in 2020. She told Zaobao that as her field is rather specialised, a bachelor’s degree would not be enough to snag a role in the big cities.

Luo initially embarked on a master’s degree to stand out from the competition but later decided to take up scientific research upon encouragement from her supervisor. But when she embarked on her PhD studies, she realised it was tougher than she had imagined, which made her consider finding a job instead. But she soon learnt the hard fact that her degree depreciates much faster than the time it takes for her to obtain it. 

Graduates of Wuhan University pose for photos during the graduation ceremony in Wuhan, in China's central Hubei province on 20 June 2023. (AFP)
Graduates of Wuhan University pose for photos during the graduation ceremony in Wuhan, in China's central Hubei province on 20 June 2023. (AFP)

After experiencing a tough internship at a small county in her undergraduate days, Luo was convinced that she had to land a job in the bigger cities by obtaining postgraduate qualifications. She lamented, “But two years later, that county now only accepts applicants with a master’s degree!”

Zhuo notes that as the value of unemployed college graduates drops over time, and the high youth unemployment rate becomes a long-term problem, successive years of employment gaps tend to snowball into increasing employment pressure on college students. He feels that the practice of providing two years' student benefits for unemployed graduates should be removed to encourage students to actively look for jobs. 

People attend a job fair in Huai'an, in China's eastern Jiangsu province on 26 May 2023. (AFP)
People attend a job fair in Huai'an, in China's eastern Jiangsu province on 26 May 2023. (AFP)

After many sleepless nights, Luo is sure that she doesn’t regret her decision. She said, “My PhD journey has taught me things beyond my field of study. If I did not pursue a doctorate degree, I would keep thinking about it. Now that I have experienced it, I've nothing to worry about anymore.”

...the school makes them submit an employment agreement as proof of having found a job or they “would not receive their academic certificate”.

Figures deeply underestimated?

Latest statistics released by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics on 15 June indicate that the surveyed unemployment rate among the 16-24 years age group was 20.8% in May, up 0.4 percentage points from the previous month and once again setting a record high since the statistic became available in 2018.

While the youth employment rate (three times that of the overall unemployment rate) seems appalling enough, college students and academics have shared that the true extent of youth unemployment could be much grimmer.

Jiang Wenxin told Zaobao that most of his peers were not able to find jobs even when graduation was just around the corner. Yet the school makes them submit an employment agreement as proof of having found a job or they “would not receive their academic certificate”.

Commonly known as the “three-party agreement”, this employment agreement is signed between the graduate, their employer and the college, and used in official statistics to gauge the employment situation of graduates.

Jiang said that the school would often pressurise students through their teachers and demand that students who have yet to find a job to “just get a signature from some employer” so that the employment statistics would look good. “Everyone knows just how unreliable these statistics are,” he said.

If the employment problem cannot be solved, the size of China’s unemployed youths may reach 50 million in five years, which means that there will be one unemployed person in every four to five families...

This file photo taken on 11 April 2023 shows people attending a job fair in China's southwestern city of Chongqing. (AFP)
This file photo taken on 11 April 2023 shows people attending a job fair in China's southwestern city of Chongqing. (AFP)

On 1 June, WeChat official account Caijing Shiyiren (财经十一人) published an article written by Wang Mingyuan, a researcher at the Reform and Development Institute of Beijing. Wang argued that the unemployment rate for those aged 16 to 24 is not representative of the overall youth unemployment rate.

The labour force participation rate, especially of those aged between 16 to 20, is not high even if these teens are not attending school, and has been hovering at above 18% for a long time. Thus, Wang looks at the employment status of those aged 16 to 40 to measure the youth unemployment rate.

In the now-deleted article, Wang looked at a variety of indicators including the number of fresh graduates employed and the number of unemployed people in the workforce, and found that China has seen an increase of 54 million unemployed youths since the three-year-long pandemic, among which 15 million of them are fresh graduates who have yet to find a job.

Wang predicts that the next few years will be the most challenging period for employment since China’s reform and opening up. If the employment problem cannot be solved, the size of China’s unemployed youths may reach 50 million in five years, which means that there will be one unemployed person in every four to five families, triggering a series of deep crises.

The crux of the issue 

Zhuo of the Development Research Center of the State Council pointed out that at the end of 2020, college graduates accounted for 46% of the 34 million-strong urban youth workforce aged 16 to 24, but a whopping 66% of unemployed youths. Thus, the key to reducing the high youth unemployment rate is in easing the challenges faced by college students in their job hunts.

... the size of the rural economy is only equivalent to the revenue of ten Huaweis or three PetroChinas, and can only offer a maximum of one to two million jobs to highly-educated youths.

People walk through a shopping mall in Beijing, China, on 30 April 2023. (Greg Baker/AFP)
People walk through a shopping mall in Beijing, China, on 30 April 2023. (Greg Baker/AFP)

Local governments around China have also launched employment campaigns in recent months, with the populous Henan province rolling out a 100-day plan to “dynamically clear” youth unemployment. Departments including the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Education also issued a joint statement in late May, requiring increased efforts in recruiting full-time community workers from college graduates.

Wang thinks that one cannot expect institutional expansion or “rural revitalisation” to solve the youth unemployment problem. Last year, state-owned enterprises and the government hired a combined total of 860,000 fresh college graduates, accounting for a mere 5% of college graduates’ demand for jobs.

And if state-owned enterprises are allowed to expand as they wish, this inevitably leads to saturation and efficiency losses. At present, the size of the rural economy is only equivalent to the revenue of ten Huaweis or three PetroChinas, and can only offer a maximum of one to two million jobs to highly-educated youths.

He pointed out that over the last decade, China’s job growth was mainly spurred by the development of private enterprises, the digital economy and the service industry. Thus, to truly solve the employment problem, one should start by improving the situation in these sectors. Aside from this, youths should also be encouraged to set up their own businesses. “A promising society is one where youths are actively creating and achieving their dreams, rather than being constantly on the road to more examinations,” he said.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “碰上最难就业季 大学生求职路茫茫”

Related: Xi Jinping calls on young Chinese to embrace hardship | More Chinese youths visiting temples to seek solace | Solving China’s soaring youth unemployment | Chinese provinces' battle for talents and workers after Chinese New Year | China’s youths are feeling the pressure from low wages

https://www.thinkchina.sg/chinas-youth-unemployment-situation-could-be-far-worse

Sunday, 25 June 2023

Saudi-Iran Deal: A Test Case of China’s Role as an International Mediator

The United States has long maintained its political power and influence in the Middle East; however, the increasing Chinese foothold in the region is changing this matrix. The clash of their interests, influence, and—more certainly—quests to play a more influential role in the region in terms of diplomacy and economic security is changing the geopolitics of the Middle East. In this regard, the Saudi-Iran deal brokered by China—an equivalent to the US-led Abraham Accords to strengthen peace in the Middle East—is yet another manifestation of the great power rivalry between Beijing and Washington. 

Interestingly, the global rift between Washington and Beijing is widening, but the tensions between the ‘rivals’ in the region are de-escalating. From Israel and the Arab States under the Abraham Accords, to now, with the peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is increasingly imperative to assess China’s growing influence in the Middle East in contrast to US’s long-held dominance in the region.

Amrita Jash
Date Published: June 23, 2023
https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/









China’s Saudi-Iran Deal

On March 10, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced the normalization of ties brokered by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with a joint trilateral statement citing that an agreement has been reached between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The statement reflects intentions “to resume diplomatic relations between them and re-open their embassies and missions within a period not exceeding two months”, as well as respect “the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in internal affairs of states.” In addition, the two sides also agreed to implement two bilateral agreements, the General Agreement for Cooperation in the Fields of Economy, Trade, Investment, Technology, Science, Culture, Sports, and Youth, and the Security Cooperation Agreement, which were signed in 1998 and 2001, respectively. However, neither agreement had been implemented, as Riyadh and Tehran froze ties in 2016 after finding themselves on opposite sides of the conflicts in Yemen and Syria.

After seven years of tensions between the two Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic relations after negotiations in the good offices of Beijing from March 6-10. This diplomatic breakthrough by Beijing marked the latest effort to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As the statement acknowledged, Iraq and Oman hosted several rounds of dialogues between Riyadh and Tehran during 2021 and 2022, which facilitated the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi-Arabia and Iran.

Against the backdrop of this previous series of negotiations, the query that demands significant attention is the following: Why did China decide to become the mediator? For so long the PRC maintained a non-interventionist approach in its foreign policy, adopting neutrality over the internal matters of other countries. In this regard, the Saudi-Iran deal sets a new precedent in Chinese foreign policy with Beijing taking on the mantle of an ‘international mediator.’ This shift in Beijing’s policy also comes at a time when the international community is seeking a solution to the Russia-Ukraine War. Hence, it is of interest to ask: Will the Saudi-Iran rapprochement pave the way for Beijing to mediate between Russia and Ukraine? Or, does this rapprochement signal Beijing’s greater desire to act as an international mediator on other issues?

 

China’s Mediation- Not a Coincidence

In the case of the Saudi-Iran deal, China’s mediatory role can be understood in context of two key incidents: The first is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022 for a series of summits. During the visit, the two sides reaffirmed in the joint statement that they would firmly support each other’s core interests, support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and jointly defend the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal matters. Moreover, at the First China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit on December 9, Xi, in his keynote speech, posited that: “China and the GCC should be partners for greater solidarity, further consolidate political mutual trust…, firmly support each other’s core interests, This indicates Xi’s intentions to paint China as a defender of territorial sovereignty and a beacon against interventionism in cooperation with GCC members.

The second incident, which followed Xi’s Riyadh visit, is Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Beijing in February 2023—the first state visit by an Iranian leader to Beijing in over 20 years. In his talks with Raisi, Xi extended China’s support to Iran, promising to safeguard its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national dignity and oppose external forces from interfering in Iran’s internal affairs and undermining its security and stability.  Present in both of Xi’s interactions was the emphasis on “internal matters”—a cue to resolve their internal tensions without any external interference. In hindsight, three key aspects in the Xi-Raisi talks foreshadowed the core principles of the Saudi-Iran deal: Iran’s willingness to actively improve relations with its neighboring countries, China’s support to the Middle East in resolving conflicts through dialogue and consultation to achieve peaceful neighborly relations, and China’s interest in playing a constructive role in promoting regional stability.

The timing of the landmark agreement is crucial. The Saudi-Iran deal also coincides with Xi’s third term presidency, both symbolically and significantly reaffirming Xi’s supreme leadership. Moreover, Beijing’s bid for the position of ‘international mediator’ in the Middle East can be situated in the larger geopolitical dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine War and pitching China as an alternative to the US-led political and security order. For instance, in contrast to every other nation, the PRC issued a position paper on February 24 advocating for the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” and arguing that “dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis.” In vouching for its role as a ‘constructive actor,’ China has been positioning itself as an alternative to the United States. For example, Beijing has denounced the US as the main culprit in the Russia-Ukraine war, whose actions of “pouring oil on the flame” are “irresponsible and immoral”, as well as officially issued a first-of-its-kind position paper on “US Hegemony and its Perils,” positing that the US “has acted more boldly to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”. Interestingly, while Beijing calls Washington’s mediation as ‘interference’, however, it defends its own role as that of ‘non-interference’ under the pretext of ‘providing good offices’.

Additionally, the Saudi-Iran deal can be seen in the framework of Xi’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) that seeks to provide an alternative global security order based on China’s solutions to global security challenges. On February 21, China released the Global Security Initiate Concept Paper positing Beijing’s commitment to “bringing about security through political dialogue and peaceful negotiation.” This paper demonstrates that the deal, as Chinese scholar Wu Bingbing argues, is “based on the Chinese perception of global security.” In light of this, China’s ‘mediation’ in the Middle East can be seen as a new manifestation of Beijing’s great power rivalry with Washington. Specifically, China’s mediation of the Saudi-Iran deal can be read as an attempt to achieve parity with the US-facilitated Abraham Accords that normalized diplomatic relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco; and the 1978 US-mediated Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel.

As some Chinese experts on the Middle East posit, the agreement demonstrates China’s role as a promoter of security and stability in the Middle East, a partner of development and prosperity, and a promoter of unity and self-improvement. Essentially, it demonstrates China’s responsibility as a powerful country. Meanwhile, American expert Stephen Walt has called the deal a “wake-up call for America” as it highlights China’s attempts to present itself as a force for peace in the world, a mantle that the US has largely abandoned in recent years.

 

China’s Interests in the Gulf

Nevertheless, China’s interest in brokering peace between Riyadh and Tehran is not altruistic in any sense. Rather, it is more crafted by design, as peace in the Middle East is vital to China’s expanding strategic interests in the Gulf. In particular, the Gulf plays an outsized role in two of China’s key interests: its economic and energy needs.

First, China’s economic interests in the Gulf are significant. China, the Arab countries’ main bilateral trade partner, had trade figures amounting to US$330 billion in 2021, US$200 billion of which amounted to China’s trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE alone. Beijing’s investments and construction projects accounted for US$43.47 billion in Saudi Arabia, US$36.16 billion in the UAE, US$30.05 billion in Iraq, US$11.75 billion in Kuwait, US$7.8 billion in Qatar, US$6.62 billion in Oman, and US$1.42 billion in Bahrain between 2005 and 2021. The Gulf is also geopolitically significant to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,  a China-led infrastructure project that aims to stretch around the globe. Some of the mega projects under BRI in the Gulf include the Saudi Arabia Neom City, King Abdulaziz International Airport, Dubai Al-Maktoum Airport phase 2, Qatar Integrated Rail Project, among others.

Second, the Gulf is linked to securing China’s energy needs—as there is a current overdependence on Middle Eastern oil— and Chinese companies are already involved in joint ventures with companies in the Middle East. In 2017, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest crude oil importer,  importing 8.4 million barrels per day (bpd). In 2022, Saudi Arabia was China’s top supplier of oil, amounting to 1.75 million bpd, while Iran, despite the US sanctions, remains to be the third largest exporter of oil to China, after Saudi Arabia and Russia. Moreover, in August 2022, Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, signed a memorandum of understanding with its Chinese counterpart, Sinopec, covering multiple areas of potential collaboration between the parties in Saudi Arabia. The other joint ventures between the two companies include Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Company (FREP) and Sinopec Senmei Petroleum Company (SSPC) in China, and Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company (YASREF) in Saudi Arabia. Overall, in its current form, the Saudi-Iran agreement does prove to be a diplomatic success for the PRC, but it is also a tricky case. This deal is a test of China’s role as an ‘international mediator,’ but there is no certainty as to how long Riyadh and Tehran will be able to sustain the manufactured peace. This also poses a challenge for China regarding maintaining an equidistance and balancing between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Against all odds, however, there is no doubt that China has a strategic game plan with a commitment to play a bigger role in Middle East politics—setting an alternative to the US under China’s GSI.

 

US’s ‘Long-held’ Influence versus China’s ‘new found’ Clout in the Middle East

The fact remains that the US-China great power rivalry is playing out in the Middle East. US’s role and dominance in the Middle East have been primarily guided by the objectives of the following: ensuring Israel’s survival and security, counterterrorism, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, projecting power through military and naval bases, arms sales to partners like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and others. China’s growing clout poses a challenge to America’s long-held political and diplomatic influence in the region. In this regard, while no clear projections can be made on what lies next in China’s Gulf policy, it is certain that US cannot afford to lose its role and space in the Middle East to China. The wisdom for Washington lies in recalibrating its ties with its close ally Saudi Arabia in particular, and other GCC countries at large. To prevent all roads in Middle East from leading to Beijing, Washington needs to revamp its role in the region, both as a balancer as well as a security provider. Hence, for the US, the key recommendations of action include proactive diplomacy, economic engagement, and a greater role in resolution of conflicts in the Middle East through US allies and partners. In all likelihood, China expanding its foothold in the Middle East will increasingly challenge the United States’ supremacy and ability to play a bigger role in the stability and political dynamics of the region, as testified by the Saudi-Iran deal.

. . .

Dr. Amrita Jash is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), India. She holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She was a Pavate Fellow at the University of Cambridge. Dr. Jash has authored The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy (Pentagon Press, 2021). Her research interests are: China’s foreign policy, Chinese military, security and strategic issues in China-India and China-Japan relations as well as the Indo-Pacific. She can be reached at: @amritajash on Twitter.

Image Credit: Paul Carmona, NSW Ports Authority

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/

Saturday, 3 June 2023

Fake Chinese honey imports spur Spanish producers to demand EU action


Spanish honey producers are demanding the EU change its labelling laws to stop the industry from collapsing due to cheap imports of fake honey from China.

Story by James Badcock • Yesterday 21:25 

A Spanish beekeeper protests in front of the Ministry of Agriculture in Madrid - Carlos Lujan/Getty Images

A Spanish beekeeper protests in front of the Ministry of Agriculture in Madrid - Carlos Lujan/Getty Images© Carlos Lujan/Getty Images

Cheap products from overseas have added to a swarm of local problems for Spanish beekeepers, who say they will be driven out of business if no action is taken to defend an industry that provides crucial pollination for the rest of the country’s agricultural sector.

“Chinese honey doesn’t pollinate plants here in Spain,” said José Luis Delgado, a beekeeper from Durón in Guadalajara province, a heartland for honey production thanks to its proliferation of flowering herbs such as lavender, thyme and rosemary.

COAG, Spain’s agricultural union, and other beekeeper associations are demanding a change in EU labelling rules on the blended honeys sold in supermarkets.

Beekeepers at work on hives in Girona, Spain - Manuel Medir/Getty
Beekeepers at work on hives in Girona, Spain - Manuel Medir/Getty© Provided by The Telegraph

There is currently no obligation to state what proportion of a blended honey comes from which country, meaning a product can appear half-Spanish when, in fact, as little as 1 per cent of it could be made up of honey from Spain.

A 2023 study carried out for the European Commission showed that half of the honey imported into the EU is being marketed fraudulently as it is not pure and contains sugar syrups, with China the biggest culprit.

Pedro Loscertales, COAG beekeeping sector chief, said consumers needed better information. In the meantime, he said, “buying directly from beekeepers is the best guarantee of authenticity and quality of honey”.

Spain is Europe’s biggest honey producer with more than three million beehives, but Mr Delgado, the farmer, describes an industry on its last legs, reeling from the triple whammy of drought, disease borne by mites and a price squeeze.

Most of Spain’s 36,000 beekeeping farmers are itinerant, moving their hives around the country on trucks to keep up with seasonal blooms.

“I think half of these traditional producers will fall by the wayside because their honey is sold by the barrel-load, with no special labelling, and they cannot compete with imports on price,” Mr Delgado told The Telegraph.

The average cost of honey imported into the European Union is €2.32 (£2) per kilo, with the typical cost of production in Spain above €3 and rising due to inflation.

Prices paid barely change

After a series of dry years, production of honey in Spain has fallen by 30 per cent since 2018, and yet, Mr Delgado said, the prices being paid by distributors have barely changed.Mr Delgado is attempting to reverse the industry tendency toward cheap blends, selling his organic honey in half-kilo jars at €8 each.

“Quality is what we have in Spain. The best thing I can leave my son is 100 customers who love our honey, rather than five tonnes of annual bulk production.”

The son of a family doctor, honey became Mr Delgado’s passion by chance when his brother was given a hive as a present.

“I lifted the lid off and became totally fascinated just standing there looking at the complexity of it all. I was so lucky the bees were happy that day and didn’t sting me; otherwise, that would have been the end of me and beekeeping.”

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/foodanddrink/other/fake-chinese-honey-imports-spur-spanish-producers-to-demand-eu-action/ar-AA1c4T6I

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