The Longer Telegram: Toward a new American China strategy
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THE LONGER TELEGRAM
Toward a new American China strategy
by Anonymous
Key points
- The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
- US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
- The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.
Table of contents
FOREWORD, by Frederick Kempe
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL CHINA STRATEGY
The significance of the China challenge
US response: Political inertia or strategic vision
Analyzing Chinese political priorities
China’s evolving strategy toward the United States
Establishing a long-term US national China strategy
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE CONTENT OF AN EFFECTIVE US CHINA STRATEGY
National measures to rebuild American economic and military strength
Deterring and preventing China from crossing US red lines
Areas of major national security concern
Areas of declared strategic competition
Areas of continued strategic cooperation
And may the best side win in the global battle for ideas
Implementation
FOREWARD
Today the Atlantic Council publishes an extraordinary new strategy paper that offers one of the most insightful and rigorous examinations to date of Chinese geopolitical strategy and how an informed American strategy would address the challenges of China’s own strategic ambitions.
Written by a former senior government official with deep expertise and experience dealing with China, the strategy sets out a comprehensive approach, and details the ways to execute it, in terms that will invite comparison with George Kennan’s historic 1946 “long telegram” on Soviet grand strategy. We have maintained the author’s preferred title for the work, “The Longer Telegram,” given the author’s aspiration to provide a similarly durable and actionable approach to China.
The focus of the paper is China’s leader and his behavior. “The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping,” it says. “US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual.”
The author of this work has requested to remain anonymous, and the Atlantic Council has honored this for reasons we consider legitimate but that will remain confidential. The Council has not taken such a measure before, but it made the decision to do so given the extraordinary significance of the author’s insights and recommendations as the United States confronts the signature geopolitical challenge of the era. The Council will not be confirming the author’s identity unless and until the author decides to take that step.
The Atlantic Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution, and this paper is no different from any other in that sense.
Nonetheless, we stand by the importance and gravity of the issues that this paper raises and view it as one of the most important the Council has ever published. The Council is proud to serve as a platform for bold ideas, insights, and strategies as we advance our mission of shaping the global future together for a more free, prosperous, and secure world. As China rapidly increases its political and economic clout during this period of historic geopolitical crisis, this moment calls for a thorough understanding of its strategy and power structure. The perspectives set forth in this paper deserve the full attention of elected leaders in the United States and the leaders of its democratic partners and allies.
Executive summary
The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping. China’s rise, because of the scale of its economy and its military, the speed of its technological advancement, and its radically different worldview than that of the United States, now profoundly impacts every major US national interest. This is a structural challenge that, to some extent, has been gradually emerging over the last two decades. The rise to power of Xi has greatly accentuated this challenge, and accelerated its timetable.
At home, Xi has returned China to classical Marxism-Leninism and fostered a quasi-Maoist personality cult, pursuing the systematic elimination of his political opponents. China’s market reforms have stalled and its private sector is now under direct forms of party control. Unapologetically nationalist, Xi has used ethnonationalism to unite his country against any challenges to his authority, internal or external. His treatment of recalcitrant ethnic minorities within China borders on genocide. Xi’s China increasingly resembles a new form of totalitarian police state. In what is a fundamental departure from his risk-averse post-Mao predecessors, Xi has demonstrated that he intends to project China’s authoritarian system, coercive foreign policy, and military presence well beyond his country’s own borders to the world at large. China under Xi, unlike under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, is no longer a status quo power. It has become a revisionist power. For the United States, its allies, and the US-led liberal international order, this represents a fundamental shift in the strategic environment. Ignoring this profound change courts peril. Xi is no longer just a problem for US primacy. He now presents a serious problem for the whole of the democratic world.
The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping.
The fundamental strategic question for the United States, under a Republican or Democratic administration, is what to do about this challenge. It is now a matter of urgency that this country develop an integrated, operational, and bipartisan national strategy to guide the content and implementation of US policy toward Xi’s China for the next three decades. Some will argue that the United States already has a China strategy, pointing to the Trump administration’s declaration of “strategic competition” as the “central challenge” of US foreign and national-security policy, as enshrined in the 2017 US National Security Strategy. However, while the Trump administration did well to sound the alarm on China and its annunciation of strategic competition with Beijing was important, its episodic efforts at implementation were chaotic and at times contradictory. At root, the issue is that “strategic competition” is a declaration of doctrinal attitude, not a comprehensive strategy to be operationalized.
The uncomfortable truth is that China has long had an integrated internal strategy for handling the United States, and so far this strategy has been implemented with reasonable, although not unqualified, success. By contrast, the United States, which once operationalized a unified strategy to deal with the challenge of the Soviet Union, in the form of George Kennan’s containment, so far has none in relation to China. This has been a dereliction of national responsibility.
Washington’s difficulty in developing an effective China strategy has been accentuated by the absence of a clearly understood strategic objective. At present, articulated objectives range from inducing Chinese economic reform through a limited trade war to full-blown regime change. Kennan’s famous 1946 “long telegram” from Moscow was primarily an analysis of the inherent structural weaknesses within the Soviet model itself, anchored by its analytical conclusion that the USSR would ultimately collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. The entire doctrine of containment was based on this critical underlying assumption. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, has been much more dexterous in survival than its Soviet counterpart, aided by the fact that China has studied carefully, over more than a decade, “what went wrong” in the Soviet Union. It would therefore be extremely hazardous for US strategists to accept that an effective future US China strategy should rest on an assumption that the Chinese system is destined to inevitably collapse from within—much less to make the “overthrow of the Communist Party” the nation’s declared objective. In fact, indulgence in politically appealing calls for the overthrow of the ninety-one-million-member CCP as a whole is strategically self-defeating. Such an approach only strengthens Xi’s hand as it enables him to circle elite political and popular nationalist wagons in defense of both party and country. The present challenge will require a qualitatively different and more granular policy response to China than the blunt instrument of “containment with Chinese characteristics” and a dream of CCP collapse.
The wisdom in Kennan’s analysis was his profound appraisal of how the Soviet Union functioned internally and the development of a US strategy that worked along the grain of that complex reality. The same needs to be done with China. The political reality is that the CCP is significantly divided on Xi’s leadership and his vast ambitions. Senior party members have been greatly troubled by Xi’s policy direction and angered by his endless demands for absolute loyalty. They fear for their own lives and the future livelihoods of their families. Of particular political toxicity in this mix are the reports unearthed by international media of the wealth amassed by Xi’s family and members of his political inner circle, despite the vigor with which Xi has conducted the anti-corruption campaign. It is simply unsophisticated strategy to treat the entire Communist Party as a single target when such internal fault lines should be clear to the analyst’s eye—and in the intelligent policy maker’s penning. A campaign to overthrow the party also ignores the fact that China, under all five of its post-Mao leaders prior to Xi, was able to work with the United States. Under them, China aimed to join the existing international order, not to remake it in China’s own image. Now, however, the mission for US China strategy should be to see China return to its pre-2013 path—i.e., the pre-Xi strategic status quo. There were, of course, many challenges to US interests during Hu’s second term, but they were manageable and did not represent a serious violation of the US-led international order. All US political and policy responses to China therefore should be focused through the principal lens of Xi himself.
Of all the elements commonly missing from discussions of US strategy toward China so far, this is the most critical. While US leaders often differentiate between China’s Communist Party government and the Chinese people, Washington must achieve the sophistication necessary to go even further. US leaders also must differentiate between the government and the party elite, as well as between the party elite and Xi. Given the reality that today’s China is a state in which Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands, and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory, US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual. This strategy must also be long term—able to function at the timescale that a Chinese leader like Xi sees himself ruling and influencing—as well as fully operationalized, transcending the rhetorical buzzwords that have too often substituted for genuine US strategy toward Beijing. Defending our democracies from the challenge posed by China will require no less.
Implementing such a strategy would require a firm understanding of Xi’s strategic objectives, which include the following:
- leapfrog the United States as a technological power and thereby displace it as the world’s dominant economic power
- undermine US dominance of the global financial system and the status of the US dollar as the global reserve currency
- achieve military preponderance sufficient to deter the United States and its allies from intervention in any conflict over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea
- diminish the credibility of US power and influence sufficiently to cause those states currently inclined to “balance” against China to instead join the bandwagon with China
- deepen and sustain China’s relationship with its neighbor and most valuable strategic partner, Russia, in order to head off Western pressure
- consolidate the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into a geopolitical and geoeconomic bloc in support of China’s policy ambitions, forming the foundation for a future Sinocentric global order
- use China’s growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s interests—particularly on human rights and international maritime law—while advancing a new, hierarchical, authoritarian conception of international order under Xi’s deliberately amorphous concept of a “community of common destiny for all mankind”
The Chinese Communist Party keenly understands Sun Tzu’s maxim that “what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy,” and the US should as well. Any US approach must seek to frustrate Xi’s ambitions. That means first clarifying which US national interests are to be protected, together with those of principal partners and allies. This includes the following:
- retain collective economic and technological superiority
- protect the global status of the US dollar
- maintain overwhelming conventional military deterrence and prevent any unacceptable shift in the strategic nuclear balance
- prevent any Chinese territorial expansion, especially the forcible reunification with Taiwan
- consolidate and expand alliances and partnerships
- defend (and as necessary reform) the current rules-based liberal international order and, critically, its ideological underpinnings, including core democratic values
- address persistent shared global threats, including preventing catastrophic climate change
Given China’s significant and growing “comprehensive national power,” some may question how this can realistically be achieved. 1 The overriding political objective should be to cause China’s elite leadership to collectively conclude that it is in the country’s best interests to continue to operate within the existing US-led liberal international order rather than build a rival order, and that it is in the party’s best interests, if it wishes to remain in power at home, not to attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores. In other words, China can become a different type of global great power than that envisaged by Xi. The primary way in which the United States can seek to achieve these ends (while also protecting its own core advantages) is to change China’s objectives and behavior. A detailed, operationalized strategy should comprise seven integrated components:
- rebuild the economic, military, technological, and human-capital underpinnings of US long-term national power
- agree on a limited set of enforceable policy “red lines” that China should be deterred from crossing under any circumstances
- agree on a larger number of “major national security interests” which are neither vital nor existential in nature but which require a range of retaliatory actions to inform future Chinese strategic behavior
- identify important but less critical areas where neither red lines nor the delineation of major national interests may be necessary, but where the full force of strategic competition should be deployed by the United States against China
- define those areas where continued strategic cooperation with China remains in US interests—where such “megathreats” include climate disruption, global pandemics, and nuclear security
- prosecute a full-fledged, global ideological battle in defense of political, economic, and societal freedoms against China’s authoritarian state-capitalist model
- agree on the above strategy in sufficiently granular form with the United States’ major Asian and European treaty allies so that their combined critical mass (economic, military, and technological) is deployed in common defense of the US-led liberal international order
These seven components should be implemented through a fully coordinated interagency and interallied effort, under the central direction of the national security advisor, underpinned by a presidential directive with the bipartisan political support to endure across multiple administrations.
This US strategy should be developed on the basis of ten core organizing principles:
The list of core domestic tasks which the United States must address as part of any effective strategy for dealing with Xi’s China is familiar. They are all structural, long term, and with dividends that will only be yielded over a decade or more. They include, but are not be limited to, the following:
- reversing declining investments in critical national economic infrastructure including next-generation 5G mobile systems
- reversing declining public investment in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, universities, and basic scientific research
- ensuring the United States remains the global leader in the major categories of technological innovation including artificial intelligence (AI)
- developing a new political consensus on the future nature and scale of immigration to the United States in order to ensure that the US population continues to grow, remains young, and avoids the demographic implosions threatening many other developed and emerging economies including China itself, while retaining the best and brightest from around the world who come to the United States to study
- rectifying the long-term budgetary trajectory of the United States so that the national debt is ultimately kept within acceptable parameters, accommodating the new expansionary monetary policy without creating an inflation crisis and weakening the role of the US dollar
- resolving, or at least reducing, the severe divisions now endemic in the political system, institutions, and culture, which undermine the capacity to agree on, make, and stick to long-term national decisions fundamental to the consolidation of historical strengths and the exploitation of new opportunities
- addressing the critical question of future national political resolve to safeguard, build, and even expand the liberal international order, rather than accept or embrace a new wave of isolationism that will inevitably drag the United States inward rather than outward and proving China wrong in its calculation that this US resolve is waning
Deterring and preventing China from crossing US red lines
The United States’ list of red lines should be short, focused, and enforceable. China’s tactic for many years has been to blur the red lines that might otherwise lead to open confrontation with the United States too early for Beijing’s liking. The United States must be very clear about which Chinese actions it will seek to deter and, should deterrence fail, will prompt direct US intervention. These should be unambiguously communicated to Beijing through high-level diplomatic channels so that China is placed on notice. This list of red lines should include these elements:
- any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons action by China against the United States or its allies, or by North Korea where China has failed to take decisive action to prevent any such North Korean action2
- any Chinese military attack against Taiwan or its offshore islands, including an economic blockade or major cyberattack against Taiwanese public infrastructure and institutions 2
- any Chinese attack against Japanese forces in their defense of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and their surrounding exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea
- any major Chinese hostile action in the South China Sea to further reclaim and militarize islands, to deploy force against other claimant states, or to prevent full freedom of navigation operations by the United States and allied maritime forces 3
- any Chinese attack against the sovereign territory or military assets of US treaty allies
Areas of major national concern
There is a further category of major national security concerns for the United States which also will warrant a US response, but not necessarily of a military nature. These are national security interests of a nonvital, but nonetheless highly significant nature. There are multiple tools in the US tool kit that can be deployed for these purposes that will not only send a message to the senior echelons of the Chinese leadership that a line has been crossed, but also administer real and measurable pain. Once again, these concerns should be communicated in advance through high-level private diplomacy. This list should include:
- continued refusal by China, within a defined time frame, to participate in substantive bilateral or multilateral strategic nuclear arms reduction talks, with the object of securing a cap on China’s program of nuclear modernization and expansion
- any action by China that threatens the security of US space assets or global communications systems
- any major Chinese cyberattack against any US or allied governments’ critical economic, social, or political infrastructure
- any act of large-scale military or economic belligerence against US treaty allies or other critical strategic partners, including India
- any act of genocide or crimes against humanity against any group within China
Areas of declared strategic competition
Deterring certain Chinese strategic behaviors, particularly in the security domain, is one thing. Punishing other behaviors where other major US national security interests are at stake is another. Allowing for a wider form of strategic competition, particularly in the diplomatic and economic domains, however, also is an important part of a fully calibrated strategy. Having all three categories within a single strategic framework is possible. The rationale for including “strategic competition” is to address those areas where the two countries have clearly conflicting policy agendas but where it is judged that these conflicts can be resolved by means other than the threat or use of force, or by other coercive or significantly punitive measures. It infers that while the interests at stake are important, they are neither existential nor critical in nature. These interests may still involve areas of policy activity that are preparatory to the eventual use of force, such as areas related to long-term military and economic preparedness. Or they may include areas which, by their nature, will never involve the use of lethal means. Nonetheless, the common characteristic for all of these areas of strategic competition must be confidence that the United States can and will prevail, with US underlying strengths and values still providing the stronger hand to play in what remains an open, competitive, international environment. These areas of strategic competition against China should include the following:
- sustaining current US force levels in the Indo-Pacific region (because to do otherwise would cause China to conclude that the United States has begun to retreat from its alliance commitments), while also modernizing military doctrine, platforms, and capabilities to ensure robust regionwide deterrence
- stabilizing relations with Russia and encouraging the same between Russia and Japan
- concluding a fully operationalized Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India, Japan, and Australia by inducing India to abandon its final political and strategic reservations against such an arrangement
- facilitating the normalization of Japan-South Korea relations to prevent Korea from continuing to drift strategically in China’s direction
- prioritizing trade, investment, development, diplomatic, and security relations between the United States and each of the Southeast Asian states, particularly with US allies Thailand and the Philippines, to prevent further strategic drift by Southeast Asia toward China
- protecting the global reserve currency status of the US dollar
- protecting critical new technologies, both US and allied, from Chinese acquisition
- integrating, to the greatest extent possible, the US, Canadian, and Mexican economies into a seamless market of five-hundred million in order to underpin long-term economic strength relative to China
- renegotiating the transpacific partnership agreement and then acceding to it
- negotiating a transatlantic trade and investment partnership with the European Union and acceding to it, along with other potential agreements on technology or other issues
- enforcing China’s pledges on trade and investment liberalization, state subsidies, dumping, and intellectual-property protection, in partnership with friends and allies, through a reformed multilateral trade dispute-resolution mechanism
- reforming and reviving the World Trade Organization (WTO), its dispute-resolution machinery, and the integrity of international trade law rather than allowing further incremental drift toward global protectionism
- investing at scale, alongside US allies, in the World Bank and the regional development banks, in order to provide emerging economies with an effective means of funding the development of their national infrastructure, thus encouraging use of the World Bank (including its transparent governance standards) as a credible alternative to the BRI
- revitalizing the UN and other multilateral and international institutions as the cornerstones of global political governance
- rebuilding the State Department including its operational budgets and staffing levels to be able to diplomatically compete with China globally
- increasing US overseas development aid through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and established United Nations (UN) humanitarian agencies in order to, together with US allies, sustain donor dominance over China through coordinated global aid delivery
- strengthening, consistent with existing international treaties, multilateral human rights institutional arrangements to maintain multilateral pressure on both China’s domestic human rights practices as well as the Communist Party’s international political legitimacy
Areas of continued strategic cooperation
There is a further set of policy challenges where it is in US interests, together with those of allies, to continue to engage in bilateral or multilateral strategic cooperation with China. This is not to make Americans feel better or to be nice to the Chinese. It is because in these areas US interests are best advanced by working with Beijing rather than against it. Under current circumstances, areas for strategic cooperation with China would include the following:
- negotiating a nuclear arms control agreement with China to bring China within the global arms control regime for the first time and to prevent a new nuclear arms race
- collaborating on the actual denuclearization of North Korea
- negotiating bilateral agreements on cyber warfare and cyber espionage
- negotiating bilateral agreements on the peaceful use of space
- negotiating protocols on future limitations on AI-controlled autonomous weapons systems
- cooperating in the Group of Twenty (G20) on global macroeconomic and financial stability to prevent future global crises and recessions
- cooperating multilaterally though the G20 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, bilaterally on global greenhouse gas reductions, and trilaterally with India, the world’s third-largest emitter
- collaborating on a global research project on breakthrough climate technologies including long-term solar-energy storage, as part of a global research consortium
- cooperating on future AI-based medical and pharmaceutical research to develop new responses to major disease categories affecting both countries including cancer
- cooperating on the development of effective future global pandemic notification and management, as well as vaccine development
And may the best side win in the global battle for ideas
Ideas still matter in politics and international relations. It is not just a question of the balance of power, critical though that is. How a people think about themselves, the types of societies being built, the economies under development, and the polities that evolve to resolve differences all profoundly shape world views. This contest of ideas will continue. Xi has already thrown down the ideological challenge to the United States and the West with his concept of an authoritarian-capitalist model and his so-called community with a shared future for mankind. For North Americans, Europeans, and others who believe in open economies, just societies, and competitive political systems, the challenge is to have continuing confidence in the inherent efficacy of the ideas upon which they rest.
Implementation: The critical role of allies
This seven-part strategy must be implemented nationally, bilaterally, regionally, multilaterally, and globally. This has been China’s approach for decades. Again, this is where allies are no longer optional but crucial, given that they can often achieve what the United States cannot, whether in particular countries, regions, or institutions. The United States should always bear in mind that China has no allies other than North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia, placing Beijing at a considerable strategic disadvantage globally relative to the United States. Allies are a great advantage. Such an approach will require an unprecedented level of US national and international policy coordination. It will require the rebuilding of the US Foreign Service and USAID. It will require the complete integration of the efforts of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, the Office of the US Trade Representative, USAID, and the intelligence community. This will mean that future national security advisors (augmented with the best and brightest high-level support staff) will need to be individually responsible for full coordination and final execution of the United States’ long-term China strategy.
Conclusion
There is no reason to believe it impossible, if such a strategy is successfully followed, that Xi will in time be replaced by the more traditional form of Communist Party leadership. Xi, as noted previously, is already provoking significant reactions against himself and his current strategic course. Over the longer term the Chinese people themselves may well come to question and challenge the party’s century-long proposition that China’s ancient civilization is forever destined to an authoritarian future. The latter, however, is ultimately a matter for the Chinese people themselves, rather than US strategy. Instead, the ambition of US strategy for the decades ahead should be to cause China’s Communist Party leadership to change strategic course—with or without Xi at the helm.
In the final analysis, the major problem facing the United States in confronting Xi’s China is not one of military, economic, or technological capabilities. It is one of self-belief. There is a subtle yet corrosive force that has been at work in the United States’ national psychology for some time now, raising doubt about the nation’s future and encouraging a sense that, as a country, America’s best days may now be in the past. Adversaries and allies sense this as well. Objectively, there is no basis for any such despair. The United States, as a country, is young, and the capacity for innovation is unsurpassed. The values for which it stands have stood the test of time. This is where the nation’s leadership must once again step up to the challenge—not just to provide the nation with vision, mission, and purpose; not just to frame the strategy and give it effect; but to cause the American people to once again believe in the nation and its capacity to provide effective global leadership for the century ahead. In doing so, the nation must also lead its friends and allies to once again believe in the United States as well.
FULL REPORT
Toward a new national China strategy
See:
ALSO:
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/24/us-china-strategy-paper-longer-telegram-stirs-little-debate-in-beijing.html
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- KEY POINTS
BEIJING — A recent U.S. strategy paper on China that’s widely read in Washington, D.C., has drawn only a passing response in Beijing where limited public discussion has focused on one point: The author got China wrong.
“The Longer Telegram” released in late January proposed how the new U.S. administration should deal with a rising China by laying out a detailed critique of the Communist Party government under President Xi Jinping.
An effective U.S. approach on China requires the “same disciplined approach it applied to the defeat of the Soviet Union,” the paper said. “US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule.”
The anonymous author is a “former senior U.S. government official,” according to the D.C.-based think tank Atlantic Council that published the lengthy paper.
The piece attempts to echo a historic document that shaped Washington’s policy on the Soviet Union — named the “The Long Telegram,” it was sent from Moscow in February 1946 at the dawn of the Cold War.
So far in Beijing, major state media have not discussed the paper much, except for the vociferous state-backed tabloid Global Times, and even then, almost entirely in English. ″‘Longer Telegram’ a late-stage hegemonic farce,” read the title of one op-ed.
On the official news website of China’s People’s Liberation Army, an article in Chinese portrayed the strategy piece as holding an outdated mentality, and contrasted its view of the country with a recent state media report about a Chinese woman’s ability to rise from poverty.
US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they ruleanonymousTHE LONGER TELEGRAM
China’s foreign ministry — in response to a question from a Global Times reporter — criticized “The Longer Telegram” for its call to contain China.
The ministry said, according to an official translation, that such comments against the ruling Communist Party were “a collection of rumors and conspiracy theories” and attempts to drive U.S.-China relations toward conflict would result in “total failure.”
The sparse state-level comments come as tensions brew between the U.S. and China, the world’s two largest economies and run by vastly different government systems.
“The Longer Telegram” generated much controversy in the U.S. foreign policy world, with critics saying the paper mischaracterizes China and puts too much emphasis on the role of Xi. But many agree with the paper’s call for a more thought-out U.S. policy on China.
That growing cohesion around a tougher U.S. stance on China is a source of concern in Beijing.
“The Longer Telegram” doesn’t represent China’s reality and isn’t a good starting point for dialogue, said Shen Yamei, deputy director and associate research fellow at state-backed think tank China Institute of International Studies’ U.S. department.
According to Shen, the mistake the paper makes is that it isn’t applicable in this situation, since China didn’t say it wanted to replace the U.S. She added that it’s the U.S. that cares about whether it will lose its central position in the world.
Critics say China’s state-dominated system benefited from being allowed to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 without rapidly incorporating the sort of free-market and rules-based system that countries like the U.S. have advocated.
A history of the long telegram
To counter these developments, “The Longer Telegram” says the U.S. should set clear red lines and points of national security for Beijing that, if crossed, would induce a firm U.S. response.
Some of these red lines include a Chinese military attack or economic blockade on Taiwan, according to the report, which also said the U.S. should push back more firmly on any Chinese threats to U.S. global communications systems.
The author of the original “Long Telegram” in 1946 was American diplomat George Kennan, who responded from Moscow to a U.S. State Department query on Soviet foreign policy. Kennan published a related article the next year in the Foreign Affairs magazine under the pseudonym “X” and in 1952 began a brief term as U.S. ambassador to Moscow.
In his paper, Kennan held that the Russians were set on expanding the Soviet system worldwide and against coexistence with the West. He believed that rather than appeasement, the U.S. should use pressure to achieve cooperation with the Soviet government, or potentially even its internal collapse.
For more than 70 years — including the Soviet Union’s disintegration in 1991 — the U.S. led a so-called liberal world order in which international institutions set rules for a global system.
That’s begun to shift in the last decade or so, with China’s growing economic and technological clout, alongside former U.S. President Donald Trump’s single-handed approach to foreign policy.
The online response
It’s not yet clear what action President Joe Biden will take, but he is sticking to a tough stance on China, albeit with a calmer tone than the previous administration.
“The challenges with Russia may be different than ones with China, but they’re just as real,” Biden told European allies in a speech last week.
Biden held his first phone call as president with Xi earlier this month. The U.S. president and first lady also issued a video greeting for the Lunar New Year, which was shared widely on Chinese social media.
Scattered online commentary about “The Longer Telegram” have remained dismissive.
In a roughly 30-minute video from Feb. 5 that has more than 900,000 views, Fudan University professor Shen Yi dismissed as a joke the paper’s attempt to replicate Kennan’s efforts.
An online article from Feb. 7 by Zhongnan University of Economics and Law professor Qiao Xinsheng said in an online article the strategy paper fails to accurately analyze the Soviet Union’s own difficulties and that the U.S. should not expect China to “disintegrate.”
