Monday, 15 May 2023

What Role Will Intellectuals Play in China’s Future?

 As we commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of China’s 1989 democracy movement, it is hard to imagine students and intellectuals playing a similar role today. 

Sebastian Veg is a Research Professor (Directeur d’Études) at the School of Advanced Studies in Social Science, Paris, and an Honorary Assistant Professor at the University of Hong Kong. His interests are in 20th century Chinese intellectual history, literature, and political debates, as well as intellectual and cultural debates in Hong Kong. He has written about and translated Lu Xun, as well as contemporary writers like Yu Jian and Dung Kai-cheung. He is presently working on a project on Chinese intellectuals’ new role after 1989.


Graduates carry umbrellas during a commencement ceremony at Wuhan University, in Wuhan, June 22, 2018.

In China’s highly marketized and politically controlled society, the space for intellectual inquiry and public intervention seems to have dwindled almost to the point of disappearing. It has often been argued that, over the course of the last century, Chinese intellectuals went from serving the state to serving the market, without ever securing a position of autonomy. However, in the last 10 years, the notion of “public intellectual” (now abbreviated as gongzhi) has become a derogatory term in China, referring to media personalities who deliver messages for interest groups and are rewarded in return. Recently, the Tsinghua University Law Professor Xu Zhangrun published a series of articles criticizing the current leadership. Yet mainstream society seems to have paid almost no heed. Do intellectuals still have anything meaningful to contribute? In China, as elsewhere, intellectuals have been forced to rethink their role and the legitimacy of their public speech.

Intellectuals can be broadly defined as producers of knowledge, whether they work in academia, publishing, journalism, or literature and arts. It is generally accepted that, in China, the role of traditional literati (shidafu) consisted in taking responsibility for the affairs of the world and making a contribution to the harmonious governance of society. After the 1911 Revolution, the former literati turned to journalism, fiction writing, teaching, or publishing, adopting the role of social critics in the May Fourth movement. Many later went on to become Leninist Party-scholars, as was famously argued by scholars like Joseph Levenson and Benjamin Schwartz, although some fought to maintain an autonomous space outside of the mass parties until 1949. Having undergone political reeducation in the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) in the early 1950s and during the Anti-Rightist movement of 1957, many intellectuals were eager to regain their traditional role as loyal advisors to the state after Mao’s death. They warmly welcomed Deng Xiaoping’s speech to the National Science Congress on March 18, 1978, in which Deng reinstated them as part of the working class. Deng reinvested academics, writers, and other “knowledge workers” with revolutionary legitimacy, allowing many of them to regain their position among the ranks of the social elite and to contribute through their expertise to Deng’s reforms. Throughout the 1980s, they worked with the reformers in the Party. The 1989 democracy movement in some ways marked the culmination of their role as responsible critics of the government aiming to provide a blueprint for a different type of society. The bloody crackdown, by contrast, led to their retreat into the Academy, a marginalization of critical voices within society, as well as a vast marketization of the field of culture, to the point that some observers have concluded that the role of intellectuals in society had come to an end.

However, in hindsight, the 1980s were perhaps less idyllic than they are sometimes made out to be. Within the broad perimeter of modernization, new spaces undeniably opened up for reformers inside and outside the state: research centers or book series were set up under the purview of university departments, state administrations, or even state-owned enterprises. But intellectuals needed protectors within the system, and the officials who offered them support were able to derive added prestige from their association with influential thinkers. In this sense, the return of intellectuals into the social mainstream took place under the aegis of the state.

This connection also determined the approach taken by intellectuals to the political situation. The Mao era was criticized as “feudal,” and it was contrasted with a renewed need for enlightenment and modernization. This qualification was consistent with the 1981 Chinese Communist Party “Resolution” on P.R.C. history, which determined that the Cultural Revolution should be condemned as a “mistake.” The term clearly illustrates the normative approach towards history taken by official institutions, and in which knowledge about the past played no role. Mao’s brutal exercise of power was simply attributed to the legacy of Chinese culture and imperial history. Despite recognizing the severe “theoretical and practical mistakes” committed under Mao’s leadership, the Party reasserted its legitimacy as representative of the working class and the entire nation. Critique of the state by intellectuals was expressed mainly through the notion of enlightenment. For example, Li Zehou, an influential philosopher, proposed the distinction between “enlightenment” (qimeng) and “national salvation” (jiuwang), arguing that it would suffice to free enlightenment from the imperative of “national salvation” and politics in order to emancipate the mind and put an end to feudalism. At the time, the young Liu Xiaobo was a lone voice that expressed disagreement with this narrative, connecting the Party’s errors with Leninism, Marxism, and modern politics. In this sense, although the 1980s for intellectuals were a decade of great confidence in their central role and their knowledge, grounded in a methodology provided by science, their role was still guaranteed by their direct links with state structures and their active collaboration in the theorization and implementation of reforms. The knowledge they produced therefore also remained largely within the monistic mold that Marxist orthodoxy inherited from Confucianism.

After the June Fourth massacre, intellectuals were criticized from all sides. The state designated them as “black hands” of the student movement, while observers described them as blinkered elitists who had prevented the student movement from operating an effective connection with workers (who were kept away from the student headquarters on the square) and ordinary citizens.

These critiques ushered in a period of reflection, during which some intellectuals argued for a return to academic work (or xueshu), rather than the abstract theorizing of the 1980s (designated as sixiang). Others “dived into the sea” of the market economy, hoping that economic reforms would facilitate a long-term liberalization of Chinese society. The debate on the “spirit of humanism” in 1992-1993 pitted advocates of the market economy who believed that democracy could be achieved through consumer culture against traditional humanists and anti-reform conservatives. In 1997, the literary scholar Wang Hui published his essay “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity,” in which he famously argued that modernity had always remained a blind spot in the dichotomy of enlightenment and feudalism. Many of China’s current problems were derived, in his view, not from the “feudalism” of traditional China but from what he termed the “crisis of modernity”: capitalism, bureaucracy, and the overwhelming power of the modern state.

However, the questioning of the tenets of modernity and enlightenment did not lead to a decisive pluralization of the intellectual field. Postmodernism and the critique of enlightenment became a selective tool to deconstruct “capitalism” and “Western rationality” and to reassert the authenticity of Chinese tradition (which was sometimes described as proto-socialist, preparing the way for Marxism). Chinese intellectuals’ attempts to question orthodoxy after 1989 often led to reformulations of Chinese exceptionalism.

In the 1990s, intellectuals split into two camps over reforms: the new left opposed market reforms, arguing that capitalism was in the throes of authoritarian politics and expressing their suspicion of representative democracy; the liberals, though recognizing criticisms of crony capitalism, advocated furthering private property and the institutions of representative democracy. But as the economic historian Qin Hui has pointed out many times, China offers the example of a state that provides neither enough freedom nor enough social protection, and both too much control and too much laissez-faire. In this sense, the theoretical debates between new left and liberals often failed to deal with the actual issues. The intellectual field became intensely polarized, provoking intense factionalism, at the same time as publishing and journalism were subject to market reforms, creating economic opportunities for certain writers or editorialists. Each faction continued to cultivate its protectors, and public interventions continued to be legitimized through recognition by the state. As a result, public intellectuals lost their credibility, and came to be seen as mouthpieces for various interest groups.

At this time, a number of intellectuals took a different path, out of the academy and the market and toward what can be described as “minjian” society, a term which refers to people, groups, publications, or associations who are non-official (as opposed to the state), grassroots (as opposed to the academic elite), and self-funded or DIY.

Wang Xiaobo (1952-1997), a cult novelist and essayist among the post-Tiananmen generation, used new commercial publications like Orient or Southern Weekly as a platform for his wide-ranging critiques of Chinese intellectuals. He took them to task for embracing utopias and always presuming to know what was best for ordinary people, leading to catastrophes like the Great Famine of 1959-1961. He mocked their Confucian self-righteousness and moral pontificating, instead advocating value neutrality. Finally, he supported viewing society from the margins, from the position of the “vulnerable” or “subaltern” groups (ruoshi qunti), who make up the “silent majority” of Chinese society. This view of a mosaic of disenfranchised groups was of course a direct challenge to the representations of society offered by Marxism.

Wang’s essays were only the crystallization of a far broader movement within society. Minjian intellectuals—relying on specific knowledge, embracing subaltern positions, investing new public forums, beholden neither to the state nor to the market—began to make their voices heard from the early 2000s. Amateur historians reconstructed family histories of the Mao era based on interviews and personal documents, and disseminated their findings through semi-official publications. Documentary filmmakers investigated Chinese society in ways that bypassed the theoretical apparatus of class and structure dominant in sociology departments. Grassroots lawyers worked with petitioners and other marginal communities to establish a shared understanding of citizenship and citizens’ rights. Bloggers challenged the monopoly of political discussion by elite academics. Although their impact remained limited, these phenomena deeply transformed China’s intellectual field, the way knowledge is produced and legitimized. For about a decade, China’s public culture, though still under the watchful eye of the state, took a turn toward a qualified pluralism.

Unfortunately, this evolution did not go unnoticed by the Chinese state, which took targeted measures to repress each of the areas in which minjian intellectuals had been active. “Historical nihilism”—explicit challenges to certain aspects of Party history—was criminalized under several headings in China’s draft civil code in 2017, in particular the defamation of heroes and martyrs. A 2016 film law outlawed the production and dissemination of any self-made film. The crackdown on NGOs like the Open Constitution Initiative and the arrests of rights lawyers on July 9, 2015 curbed the development of citizens’ rights. A new set of Internet regulations ensured that “Big Vs” (verified users) were reduced to silence. However, despite banning textbooks “promoting Western values,” the pluralization of knowledge is difficult to quell.

In this sense, the turn away from intellectual elitism and toward citizen knowledge may have more long-term effects than are apparent at the moment. It is true that the 1980s may seem relatively free in comparison with the current crackdown. However, they were also a time when intellectuals relied strongly on elite connections with the state, and when their interventions were still largely couched in the Marxist categories of Chinese academia. In the 1990s, intellectual production became intensely marketized, which entailed a return of factionalism, but not necessarily a culture of greater public exchange. It was only in the 2000s that minjian intellectuals questioned the monopoly of academia on knowledge production and sought ways to understand history, society, or citizenship, that were outside the boundaries of official academic inquiry. The impact of the current repression on China’s intellectual world is undeniable. However, we should not forget that under the surface of repression, deeper trends may be at work that continue to pluralize Chinese society.

What Role Will Intellectuals Play in China’s Future? | ChinaFile

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Why George Soros is obsessed with defeating Xi Jinping’s China

 Chinese academic Sun Peisong notes that renowned financier George Soros has always been critical of China’s social system. While "the man who broke the Bank of England" has a keen eye for finance, Sun feels that Soros’s criticism of China’s “closed society” sheds light on his penchant for globalisation and dated means of making the wealthy wealthier.

09 Jun 2022

Director, Lianyungang Development Research Institute

Hungary-born US investor and philanthropist George Soros answers to questions after delivering a speech on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos on 24 May 2022. (Photo: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP)
Hungary-born US investor and philanthropist George Soros answers to questions after delivering a speech on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos on 24 May 2022. (Photo: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP)

At the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, renowned Hungary-born American investor George Soros restated his views on the struggle between open and closed societies. 

He said, “In an open society, the role of the state is to protect the freedom of the individual; in a closed society the role of the individual is to serve the rulers of the state.” In his view, China and Russia are the “greatest threat” to open societies today, and the world is increasingly engaged in “a struggle between two systems of governance that are diametrically opposed to each other”.

This is not the first time that the 92-year-old has criticised China. Soros has been expressing his negative views in articles and speeches since the latter half of 2021. He sees China’s recent economic regulations and market supervision as “a systematic campaign to remove or neutralise people who have amassed a fortune”, and wants open societies to transform China.   

“As founder of the Open Society Foundations, my interest in defeating Xi Jinping’s China goes beyond US national interests.” 

Soros said at a seminar in January this year that China, controlled by “a true believer in Communism”, is the “greatest threat that open societies face today”. Hence, he believes that the Chinese leader should be replaced by someone who follows the Western model, and urges international society to do everything in its power to encourage China to move in the “desired direction”.  

Soros also wrote in The Wall Street Journal in 2019, “As founder of the Open Society Foundations, my interest in defeating Xi Jinping’s China goes beyond US national interests.” 

Visitors walk by images of Chinese President Xi Jinping displayed at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, China November 11, 2021. REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins
Visitors walk by images of Chinese President Xi Jinping displayed at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, China, 11 November 2021. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)

While such outright opposition to China is rare among global financiers, his desire to change the nature of the Chinese regime is clear.

Taking advantage of the Western market system

China’s economic progress over the past 40 years has fuelled global growth and benefited both developing and developed countries. This is a view held by many experts in the financial and investment fields. 

However, Soros’s remarks represent the views of another group of people — the financial tycoons. Soros’s hostility towards China stems from his uncertainty as to whether he can continue to amass wealth the way he used to, his frustrations with China, and his attachment to the era when multinational capital could get him anything he wanted.      

Indeed, Soros is a man whose worldview is shaped by money and has a unique way of grabbing wealth.

In reality, Soros is a paradox. On the one hand, he appears to be a political figure: he supports dissidents from some countries and helps them seek “democracy”. On the other hand, he also appears to be an idealistic intellectual who flies high the banner for “open societies”, like an enlightened social pioneer. A man who stays ahead of the curve in the stock markets, in his prime, Soros would meet “one president for breakfast and another for dinner”. 

Soros's trademark is his ability to cloak his identity as a businessman under the halo of advocating an ideal political order through political and philosophical discourse, and to amass great wealth by taking advantage of the Western market system. 

People walk through the financial district of Canary Wharf in London, Britain, 18 May 2022. (Kevin Coombs/Reuters)
People walk through the financial district of Canary Wharf in London, UK, 18 May 2022. (Kevin Coombs/Reuters)

In 1992, Soros launched a speculative attack on the British pound, despite claiming to love Britain. He was chastised for taking money from every British taxpayer, reportedly making a profit of US$1 billion. Indeed, he came to be known as “the man who broke the Bank of England”.

He claims to love the people of the Soviet Union and thus started a foundation in the Soviet Union in 1987. However, he made a fortune in 1994 during a mass privatisation programme, when the shares of state-owned Soviet enterprises were distributed to the people at very low prices and there was a serious lack of private investment funds. When accused of robber capitalism, he replied that he had “no sense of guilt” in the markets.

Soros set up various foundations across 25 countries, mostly in Eastern Europe. The combination of unprecedented opportunities and abundant capital produced a profit explosion. Most of the Open Society Foundations (OSFs) he set up in numerous countries also include his own business plans.

Soros's trademark is his ability to cloak his identity as a businessman under the halo of advocating an ideal political order through political and philosophical discourse, and to amass great wealth by taking advantage of the Western market system.

Frustrations with China

China’s rise no doubt provides a reference case for replacing the Western model and presents a possible end to wealthy Westerners being able to freely amass wealth from all over the world. This is indeed a frightening prospect for people like Soros, and also a reason why he opposes China.

Chinese culture does not advocate putting the wealthy in charge.   

Pedestrians near the Bund in Shanghai, China, on 1 June 2022. (Qilai Shen/Bloomberg)
Pedestrians near the Bund in Shanghai, China, on 1 June 2022. (Qilai Shen/Bloomberg)

Soros’s hatred for the Chinese system also stems from the frustrations he has faced in the country. During the Asian financial crisis in 1988, he learnt a painful lesson in Hong Kong. Later in 2011, his covetous plans for the Chinese financial market failed again. Throughout his career, China has been a hurdle he has not overcome. 

Thus, he made “defeating China” his life goal. He believes that open societies are where people like him can live and thrive. He acknowledges that his behaviour interferes in the internal affairs of other countries as the act of advocating open societies extends beyond national sovereignty. Evidently, the Chinese system and Soros’s pursuits are at odds.    

While Soros's plan to defeat China is consistent with the US’s current geopolitical strategy, he is out of touch with reality if he thinks that China, under the pressure of the US and its allies, will turn into the kind of society that he can profit from.

China today does not think that the US — a social system where the richest 1% own more wealth than the bottom 95% — is democratic, universal or a model that should be emulated. Indeed, Chinese culture does not advocate putting the wealthy in charge.   

The era in which Soros found success — and is attached to — is one where the concept of globalisation was oversold.

Even though Soros is a Jew who once lived under Nazi rule, he fails to understand that his and the US’s attempt at transforming China is in fact similar to the Nazi belief in German supremacy and that the world must be healed by the German spirit. 

People stand on a platform at Berlin Central Station, in Berlin, Germany, 1 June 2022. (Annegret Hilse/Reuters)
People stand on a platform at Berlin Central Station, in Berlin, Germany, 1 June 2022. (Annegret Hilse/Reuters)

The era in which Soros found success — and is attached to — is one where the concept of globalisation was oversold. He believes that China’s rise against the wishes of the West has caused global economic decoupling. For him, a defeated China would be better for the “open society”. 

When the globalisation mantra was at its peak, public opinion described social realities and changes in terms of “the world is flat”, open and connected. Proponents of globalisation questioned the organising principle of the state and society, and believed that borders and barriers would obstruct progress and prosperity. 

Under such a paradigm, not only would trade and investment be globalised in the future, but also cultures, shared knowledge, principles and norms. Adapting to this trend, countries of Europe, one of the most developed regions in the Western world, put aside national sovereignty and formed a union.      

Thus, at that time, it was not only forms of government with clear national identities that could play a role in international politics. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could also pay a major role, encroach on national structures, interfere in matters within the scope of state authority, and share political authority. 

Now, the world has reached a point where it needs to “reclaim its sovereignty”.

Hence, by setting up NGOs such as the OSFs in the name of advocating “social openness”, Soros was able to interfere in the political agendas of other countries and make a career for himself.       

Now, the world has reached a point where it needs to “reclaim its sovereignty”. The UK left the EU to do so, while the former Trump administration withdrew the US from various international organisations, opposed free trade and investment, rejected immigrants, set up national security barriers and encouraged a climate of protectionism. 

A view shows a supermarket in a shopping mall damaged by a Russian missile strike, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in Kharkiv, Ukraine, 8 June 2022. (Vitalii Hnidyi/Reuters)
A view shows a supermarket in a shopping mall damaged by a Russian missile strike, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in Kharkiv, Ukraine, 8 June 2022. (Vitalii Hnidyi/Reuters)

Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the West’s sanctions against Russia have brought globalisation to an unexpected end. In the process of deglobalisation, non-governmental actors’ interference in countries' internal affairs is fast losing legitimacy. Transnational operations of NGOs have also been obstructed by the West's new agenda. In the end, efforts to defeat China have not reversed the downfall of Soros’s OSFs.

China’s pursuit of common prosperity

In practising socialism, China believes that common prosperity is the essence of modernity and hopes to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor as well as ensure that wealth is more evenly distributed. The foundation of the Chinese socialist project has always included the goal of achieving equality, a universal pursuit of all socialists.   

The value of the Chinese economic model is perhaps most clearly seen in the fact that China is getting closer to becoming the world’s largest economy. While China has numerous political, economic and social problems that need to be solved, China’s economic advancement has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and created a massive urban middle class. 

... helping the US government thwart or defeat China should not be the goal of outstanding people such as Soros. On the contrary, advocating China-US cooperation would be better for our world.

Since modern times, the Chinese society has never been as wealthy as they are today. It accomplished in a few decades what the West took more than two centuries to achieve, and also modernised various aspects of its economy, from geographic space to production methods.    

Soros is a man with unique social ideals. In an increasingly multipolar world, helping the US government thwart or defeat China should not be the goal of outstanding people such as Soros. On the contrary, advocating China-US cooperation would be better for our world.

Related: Why China is embarking on the journey of 'common prosperity' | Why the Americans know China better than the Chinese know the US | Is Chinese socialism superior? | Why democracy is failing and why some authoritarian regimes might just work | Every individual counts: China should go for ‘common development’ rather than ‘common prosperity’





https://www.thinkchina.sg/why-george-soros-obsessed-defeating-xi-jinpings-china?

China’s nationalistic frenzy stems from an inferiority complex: Chinese commentator

 Chinese netizens were riled into a nationalistic frenzy when free ice-cream was allegedly given to a foreigner but not a Chinese person at the Shanghai Auto Show. How could such a small incident ruffle so many feathers? Commentator Jin Jian Guo explains.

04 May 2023

Political commentator  

https://www.thinkchina.sg/chinese-commentator-chinas-nationalistic-frenzy-stems-inferiority-complex

People walk past the Drum Tower in Beijing, China, 5 March 2023. (Tingshu Wang/Reuters)
People walk past the Drum Tower in Beijing, China, 5 March 2023. (Tingshu Wang/Reuters)

Recently, a nationalist wave spread across China when free ice-cream was allegedly given to a foreigner but not a Chinese person at the Shanghai Auto Show. How incredulous! Although BMW Mini issued an apology after the incident, acknowledging that the “careless management and staff negligence caused unpleasantness for everyone”, the nationalistic Chinese continued on their rampage. They started smashing BMW Mini cars, just like they did Japanese cars in an earlier anti-Japanese tirade. A solar company (丰投光能公司) in Suzhou even got its BMW-driving employees to switch to China-made vehicles within the month, dangling a cash reward of 20,000 RMB (roughly US$2,900) and threatening to dismiss those who did not comply. 

These irrational Chinese are not patriotic — they are simply destroying the country. 

Harmful nationalistic Chinese

Even as Chinese netizens lambasted BMW Mini for insulting China, they didn’t forget to mock the explosion of Elon Musk’s SpaceX rocket. These haters fail to realise that Musk’s failures are the mother of his success — didn’t China’s rocket launches also fail before? Such displays of highly irrational and ugly nationalist sentiments only damage the country’s international image and business environment. These irrational Chinese are not patriotic — they are simply destroying the country. 

The SpaceX Starship explodes after launch for a flight test from Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas, US, on 20 April 2023. (Patrick T. Fallon/AFP)
The SpaceX Starship explodes after launch for a flight test from Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas, US, on 20 April 2023. (Patrick T. Fallon/AFP)

This is just like the earlier case of Chinese netizens accusing foreign investors of exploiting the Chinese, but now that foreign companies are leaving China one by one and young people are left with few job opportunities, these attackers have finally stopped. The reality shows that when foreign investors leave China, China’s job opportunities lessen by the day.

Why did a cup of ice cream stir up such a huge controversy in China? The nub of the issue is the Chinese people’s “century of humiliation” complex that refuses to go away. The historical narrative of mainland China is marked by two characteristics: one, China’s 5,000-year-old civilisation, understood as one that has developed uninterrupted up to the present day; and two, modern Chinese history represented by the “century of humiliation”.  

The first characteristic is a mere exaggeration. Archaeological findings show that the history of Chinese civilisation is about 3,760 years old. (NB: The beginning of the Chinese civilisation continues to be debated depending on the definition of civilisation and the criteria that define a beginning.) Not only that, at one point, the Han Chinese-dominated regime had been destroyed by the Mongols and Manchus.

People stroll on a street near the Forbidden City in Beijing, China, on 5 April 2023. (Ludovic Marin/AFP)
People stroll on a street near the Forbidden City in Beijing, China, on 5 April 2023. (Ludovic Marin/AFP)

The second characteristic shows that Chinese people have failed to reflect deeply on the decline of authoritarian regimes one after another since the Qin dynasty. Notably, the Eight-Nation Alliance was led into Beijing by the Chinese people themselves, while Yuanmingyuan (the Old Summer Palace) could only have been burnt by British and French troops with the help of the Chinese people — hearing that the allied forces were having difficulties setting Yuanmingyuan on fire, they brought braziers and straw to help them. The people’s only wish was to share the spoils of these escapades with the foreigners. 

The political characteristic of Chinese nationalism is portraying Western countries as enemies, and cultivating seeds of hatred starting from childhood.

Pent-up hatred and a chip on the shoulder

Over 100 years later, something peculiar has happened: while previously the emperor’s private property was burned and the common people under imperial rule followed suit by remorselessly looting and burning, today the Chinese people seethe with hatred of another kind.

The Qing emperor's personal humiliation has suddenly become the humiliation of the people and the nation, and this change came about because the situation in mainland China calls for uniting the people through nationalism; only by tapping on historical humiliation to get the people to feel the security provided by a strong government can the regime be consolidated and stabilised.

ice cream incident
A nationalist wave spread across China when free ice-cream was allegedly given to a foreigner but not a Chinese person at the Shanghai Auto Show. (Internet)

The political characteristic of Chinese nationalism is portraying Western countries as enemies, and cultivating seeds of hatred starting from childhood. Hence, Chinese-style patriotic education is necessarily linked to opposing the West.

Amid such a patriotic atmosphere, even two cups of ice cream can evoke the historical humiliation of “Chinese and dogs not allowed”. This victim mentality is equivalent to having a “glass heart”, behind which lies a lack of rational thinking — long-term nationalism has nurtured such hyper-sensitivity, leading to extremely ugly behaviour.

The Chinese people’s inferiority complex is fundamentally due to their lack of confidence when dealing with Westerners.

A risk of instability

Ugly nationalism reflects the Chinese people’s sense of inferiority and blind confidence. In a country that claims to be wealthy, whether or not one gets to eat ice cream should be of no consequence; but to the poor, the value of the ice cream has to do with their ego in whether they have been respected. The Chinese people’s inferiority complex is fundamentally due to their lack of confidence when dealing with Westerners.

BMW XM cars are displayed during the 20th Shanghai International Automobile Industry Exhibition in Shanghai on 18 April 2023. (Hector Retamal/AFP)
BMW XM cars are displayed during the 20th Shanghai International Automobile Industry Exhibition in Shanghai on 18 April 2023. (Hector Retamal/AFP)

On the other hand, the Chinese people also show blind confidence. After the ice cream incident, CCTV aired a message claiming that BMW’s stock had plummeted. Chinese netizens cheered, and the implicit message was that offending China will not end well. However, the truth was that German stocks had plummeted, and it had nothing to do with what happened in China.

China’s ugly nationalist sentiment is rooted in a victim mentality of being unable to shake off a century of humiliation, as well as an extremely sensitive sense of inferiority, which sometimes also shows blind confidence. Living in a figurative well without understanding the outside world, accepting official propaganda, and lacking critical thinking and knowledge of history — all these are how extreme Chinese nationalism has been shaped. Nationalism is a double-edged sword, and in some cases, countries that manipulate nationalism can bring great instability upon themselves. This is why mainland China will not easily use force to reunify with Taiwan.

Related: Shanghai Auto Fair: Battle of the Chinese EV giants | Pelosi’s Taiwan visit reveals the ugliness of Chinese nationalism | Chinese butting heads with Western media: Irrational nationalism or deeds of justice? | Pandemic nationalism rages among Chinese youths | Class struggle and extreme nationalism have become CCP’s ideological weapons

https://www.thinkchina.sg/chinese-commentator-chinas-nationalistic-frenzy-stems-inferiority-complex


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