Monday, 12 December 2022

China finally approves an mRNA COVID vaccine—but only for some foreigners

 Two years after the first countries approved the Pfizer/BioNTech COVID vaccine for domestic use, China will finally allow the mRNA vaccine to be used domestically—but there's a catch.

On Friday, China confirmed in a press briefing that it would let German nationals receive the BioNTech COVID vaccine, which uses mRNA technology, in exchange for German health authorities on Wednesday approving China's Sinovac jab for Chinese nationals living in Germany.

The statement from China’s foreign ministry clarifies an earlier announcement by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz during his trip to Beijing that BioNTech would be made available to foreign nationals in China.

But Beijing's decision to approve the Pfizer/BioNTech jab for a sliver of China's population highlights the country’s uneasy relationship with mRNA vaccines and shots developed overseas as Beijing embarks on an exit from its tough COVID-zero policy, which will likely cause a massive outbreak.

Has China approved mRNA vaccines?

BioNTech is the first mRNA vaccine—and the first developed overseas—approved for use in mainland China, even if it's just available to German nationals living there.

Several Chinese companies are developing mRNA vaccines, but none have made it to final approval. In September, Indonesia—not China—became the first country to approve a Chinese-developed mRNA vaccine, from pharmaceutical company Walvax.

Fosun Pharmaceuticals, BioNTech's distribution partner for greater China, secured 100 million doses for the Chinese market in December 2020. Yet Fosun's applications to use its doses in mainland China are still pending, with no indication of when the mRNA vaccine will be approved for widespread use. (The semiautonomous Chinese city of Hong Kong approved BioNTech for use in its vaccination campaigns.)

China has largely relied on two vaccines, from Sinovac and Sinopharm, in its vaccination campaign. The two vaccines use an inactivated virus to confer immunity. Studies show that the two vaccines are less effective at preventing infection, severe disease, and death than the BioNTech and Moderna shots, which use mRNA technology.

Sinovac and Sinopharm are both developing boosters that specifically target the Omicron variant.

Public health officials have blamed China’s less-effective vaccines for hindering its ability to smoothly change its COVID policy. “The efficacy of the China‑made vaccines are not at the level of the vaccines that have been used in the United States,” Anthony Fauci, the outgoing White House medical adviser, told the Washington Post on Dec. 2.

How many Chinese have been vaccinated?

The more pressing problem, in Beijing's view, is not the effectiveness of its vaccines, but that not enough people are vaccinated. Official data released in early December shows that only 40% of China’s over-80 population has received a booster. Health officials at the time pledged to launch new campaigns to vaccinate China's elderly, but now the task is especially urgent.

Beijing announced sweeping changes to its COVID rules last Wednesday, including letting mild and asymptomatic cases recover at home and limiting lockdowns to individual floors and buildings, rather than whole neighborhoods. A pivot is likely good news for China’s economy, dragged down in November by a record COVID outbreak and widespread lockdowns. Chinese consumer sentiment last month fell to levels not seen since early 2020, the start of the pandemic, according to a survey released Sunday by Morning Consult.

But relaxed measures could lead to a surge in cases across China. One of the country’s top medical advisers predicted last week that as much as 60% of the country could catch COVID in an initial exit wave.

Chinese officials are now reassuring people that an increase in cases is not a cause for concern. State media quoted Zhong Nanshan, the country’s top medical expert, on Friday as saying that Omicron’s death rate is comparable to that of influenza.

This story was originally featured on Fortune.com

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-finally-approves-mrna-covid-065627541.html

Wednesday, 9 November 2022

The One-China Policy in Transition

 The United States’ One-China policy has been at the center of recent controversy. Rebutting Beijing’s accusations that Washington is changing the status quo, US officials have stressed that the United States remains committed to the One-China policy, but their explanations of the policy have not always been complete or accurate. This article discusses recent developments in the One-China policy and how to interpret the United States’ silence on Taipei’s assertions of sovereignty and independence.

James Lee
Date Published: November 7, 2022
https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/11/07/the-one-china-policy-in-transition/



The dispute over Taiwan has been at the center of recent US-China tensions. One of the main areas of debate has been the United States’ adherence to its “One-China policy,” under which the United States recognizes Beijing as the government of China and maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan. Rebutting Beijing’s accusations that the United States is supporting Taiwan’s independence by having senior US officials visit the island, Washington has repeatedly stressed that the One-China policy has not changed and that the United States continues to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo. The “status quo” has not been formally defined, however, and neither has the “unofficial” character of US relations with Taiwan. In the past, this ambiguity helped both sides to obscure the fundamental differences between them. But amid recent tensions, those differences have been laid bare, leading some policymakers and policy analysts to question its continuing viability while others insist on its continuing importance. For the United States, the central issue is deciding on the limits and opportunities for deepening support for Taiwan at a time when Beijing poses an acute threat.

In recent years, US officials have explained the One-China policy in ways that are incomplete or even inaccurate. In addition to apparent gaffes (e.g., President Biden calling Taiwan independent; Biden saying Taiwan could decide for itself on independence; Biden referring to a mysterious “Taiwan agreement”; and Secretary Blinken calling Taiwan a country twice), the Biden administration has at times avoided firmly articulating the One-China policy. For example, in May 2022, the State Department’s fact sheet on US relations with Taiwan was revised to omit two statements: the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China (found in the Shanghai Communiqué and the Normalization Communiqué); and the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence (found in the Arms Sales Communiqué). The second of those statements was eventually restored, but the first was not, demonstrating the Biden administration’s reluctance to fully explain US policy toward Taiwan.

US officials have also expressed the One-China policy in ways that do not reveal the United States’ clear position on the sovereignty of Taiwan. Echoing a similar statement by David Stilwell in August 2020, then-Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby stated in October 2021 that the United States took no position on the sovereignty of Taiwan. State Department spokesperson Ned Price issued a similar statement in September 2022. It is debatable as to how deliberate this choice of wording was, but it is still not the official policy. The United States has a position on the sovereignty of Taiwan: it is undetermined, as stated by President Truman on June 27, 1950. During the normalization of US-PRC relations, the United States resisted Beijing’s pressure to recognize Taiwan as part of China. One of the Six Assurances that the United States conveyed to Taiwan in August 1982 was that the United States “has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” The United States never changed its position that Taiwan was undetermined, so it is not correct to say that the United States takes no position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. The difference between “no position” and “undetermined” may seem subtle, but it is significant. If the United States had no position, it could neither agree nor disagree with Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Since the United States does have a position that Taiwan’s status is undetermined, it disagrees with Beijing: the United States does not consider Taiwan to be part of China.

In implementing the One-China policy, the United States has been silent after statements from Taipei that Washington does not agree with. Contrary to Beijing’s claim that it is “pro-independence,” the Tsai administration has adopted a moderate policy of stating that Taiwan does not need to declare independence because it is already an independent and sovereign state called the Republic of China (Taiwan). Tsai herself stated this position in a 2020 interview with the BBC, and the Presidential Office recently asserted Taiwan’s existing independence and sovereignty in response to Xi Jinping’s speech on Taiwan during the 20th Communist Party Congress. The United States has neither endorsed nor disputed Taipei’s position. US policy has been to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo, not unilateral interpretations of what the status quo is (which is what the Tsai administration’s official position amounts to). Similarly, the United States’ lack of recognition of Taiwan does not mean that the United States denies the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Washington’s silence on these statements from Taipei is consistent with the One-China policy.

But there have been controversies surrounding the One-China policy that have seen US officials asserting their views openly. One of the most prominent sources of controversy centers on the policy of strategic ambiguity, under which the United States does not state whether or how it would intervene if Beijing uses force or coercion to take control of Taiwan (as opposed to strategic clarity, under which the United States would commit to defending Taiwan). In May 2022, President Biden said that strategic clarity was “the commitment we made” at some point in the past. The White House soon clarified that there had been no change in US policy; but Biden then made a similar statement in September, and in subsequent remarks, James Moriarty, the Chair of the American Institute in Taiwan (the United States’ de facto embassy), claimed that Biden’s statement was consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.

The controversy on strategic ambiguity is closely related to disputes over how to interpret the Taiwan Relations Act. Subsection 2(2)(f) of the Taiwan Relations Act states that US policy is “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist” Beijing’s potential use of force or coercion against Taiwan; it does not say that the United States will necessarily exercise that capacity. Subsection 3(3) says that in the event of a threat to Taiwan’s security, “the President and the Congress shall determineappropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger” (emphasis added). This is weaker language than that of a formal alliance treaty, such as “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith…such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force” (North Atlantic Treaty) and “declares that it would act to meet the common danger” (US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty; US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; emphases added). In other words, the Taiwan Relations Act does not state that the United States will necessarily act or intervene if Beijing uses force or coercion against Taiwan, and this is what distinguishes the TRA from an alliance treaty.

There is evidence that the Biden administration recognizes that the Taiwan Relations Act is worded in a way that conveys strategic ambiguity. The version of the Taiwan Policy Act that was first introduced in the Senate in June 2022 included a proposed revision to the Taiwan Relations Act (in Subsection 201(a)(2)) that would have removed “to maintain the capacity of the United States,” leaving the policy as “to resist” Beijing’s potential use of force or coercion against Taiwan. This change would have formalized a shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity; but amid reports that the Biden administration expressed reservations about the Taiwan Policy Act to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this provision was subsequently removed. Moreover, a new rule of construction was added (Section 1102) stating that “nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force or the introduction of United States forces into hostilities.” And in the administration’s National Security Strategy released in October 2022, the language on Taiwan follows that of the Taiwan Relations Act: “and we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.” As far as official policy is concerned, strategic ambiguity is still in place, though Biden has clearly indicated his personal preference.

The US stance on the One-China policy is in transition. Although it has fixed elements, such as recognizing Beijing as the sole legal government of China and maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan, those elements are written at a high level of abstraction. Such abstractions create room for interpretation on how to conduct the day-to-day diplomacy of US-Taiwan relations. The United States has periodically revised the implementation of the One-China policy in the interest of promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. It also has exercised its own discretion over how it chooses to interpret “unofficial” relations and the “status quo.” The question is how far the United States can revise its policy without leading to escalation. A balanced approach to this issue will involve both deductive and inductive elements. Deductively, Washington should decide what is logically consistent with its statements of policy in the Three US-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. Inductively, Washington should weigh how Taipei, Beijing, and US allies are likely to react to potential changes in US policy. Of course, the United States will have to decide what is in its own interest, but that will require the United States not to take actions that will produce a response from Beijing that will threaten US interests—as conflict over Taiwan surely would.

. . .

James Lee is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica (Taiwan) and an affiliated researcher of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC).

Image Credit: Wikimedia CommonsCreative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/11/07/the-one-china-policy-in-transition/


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Sunday, 6 November 2022

Chinese ambassador warns Swiss: Sanction us and ties will suffer

 ZURICH, Nov 6 (Reuters) - Switzerland should avoid following the European Union by imposing sanctions on China if it cares about Swiss-Sino relations, the Chinese ambassador to Bern told the NZZ am Sonntag newspaper.

Workers adjust a Swiss (L) and Chinese flag before a bilateral meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Swiss Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, January 15, 2016. REUTERS/Mark Schiefelbein/Pool

Last year, the EU accused Chinese officials of mass detentions of Muslim Uighurs and human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region and imposed its first sanctions against Beijing since an arms embargo in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square crackdown.

Switzerland has not yet decided to follow the EU's lead.

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"Anyone who really cares about the friendly relations between the two countries and who makes responsible policy will not agree to the sanctions," China's ambassador in Bern, Wang Shihting, told the NZZ am Sonntag.

"If Switzerland adopts the sanctions and the situation develops in an uncontrolled direction, Sino-Swiss relations will suffer," he added.

The head of the Swiss agency that implements economic sanctions said in a newspaper interview in July she expects the neutral country to adopt any punitive measures the EU launches against China if it invades Taiwan.

In unveiling a new strategy on China last year, Bern announced few concrete policy changes and stressed the importance of bilateral ties. But it spoke more openly about its disapproval of China's human rights record than it has tended to do in the past.

In 1950, Switzerland was one of the first western countries to recognise Communist China. Since 2010, China has been its biggest trading partner in Asia and its third-largest globally after the EU and the United States.

A bilateral free trade agreement took effect in July 2014, and the two countries this year launched a joint platform for stock listings and trading.

https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-ambassador-warns-swiss-sanction-us-ties-will-suffer-2022-11-06/

Friday, 4 November 2022

Germany need China more than ever

 Germany’s leader and top CEOs have arrived in Beijing. They need China more than ever

Analysis by  and , CNN Business
Updated 6:28 AM EDT, Fri November 4, 2022

Hong Kong/LondonCNN Business — 

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrived in China on Friday with a team of top executives, sending a clear message: business with the world’s second-largest economy must continue.

Scholz met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People after landing in the capital Friday morning and was received by Premier Li Keqiang in the afternoon.

Joining Scholz for the whirlwind one-day visit is a delegation of 12 German industry titans, including the CEOs of Volkswagen (VLKAF), Deutsche Bank (DB), Siemens (SIEGY) and chemicals giant BASF (BASFY), according to a person familiar with the matter. They were expected to meet with Chinese companies behind closed doors.

The group entered China without undergoing a mandatory seven-day hotel quarantine standard for most arrivals. Images showed hazmat-clad medical workers greeting Scholz’s jet at Beijing’s Capital International Airport to test the official delegation for Covid-19 upon their arrival.

During the Friday morning meeting between the two leaders, Xi called for Germany and China to work together amid a “complex and volatile” international situation, and said the visit would “enhance mutual understanding and trust, deepen pragmatic cooperation in various fields and plan for the next phase of Sino-German relations,” according to a readout from state broadcaster CCTV.

Speaking at a press conference with Premier Li, Scholz said that Germany’s economic relationship with China had recently become “more difficult” because Beijing was making access to some of its markets more difficult.

“We are seeing discussions in China tending more towards autonomy and less economic ties. And these views are ones that need discussing,” Scholz said.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrives at Beijing Capital International Airport on November 4, 2022.

Scholz’s visit — the first by a G7 leader to China in roughly three years — comes as Germany slides towards recession. But it has fired up concerns that the interests of Europe’s biggest economy are still too closely tied to those of Beijing.

Since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine this year, Germany has been forced to ditch its long dependence on Russian energy. Beijing has declared its friendship with Moscow has “no limits,” while China’s relations with the United States are deteriorating.

Now, some in Scholz’s coalition government are growing nervous about Germany’s ties with China.

The tension was highlighted recently by a fierce debate over a bid by Chinese state shipping giant Cosco to buy a 35% stake in the operator of one of the four terminals at the port of Hamburg. Under pressure from some members of the government, the size of the investment was limited to 24.9%.

The potential deal has raised concerns in Germany that closer ties with China will leave critical infrastructure exposed to political pressure from Beijing, and disproportionately benefit Chinese companies.

But Germany is hardly in a position to rock the boat with Beijing as it grapples with the challenge of reviving its struggling economy. Its consumers and companies have borne the brunt of Europe’s energy crisis, and a deep recession is looming.

If the European Union and Germany were to decouple from China, it would lead to “large GDP losses” for the German economy, Lisandra Flach, director of the ifo Center for International Economics, told CNN Business.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimates that a major reduction in trade between the European Union and China would shave 1% off of Germany’s GDP.

Germany needs to shore up its export markets as ties with Russia, once its main supplier of natural gas, continue to unravel.

When it comes to China, Germany won’t want to “lose also this market, this economic partner,” said Rafal Ulatowski, an assistant professor of political science and international studies at the University of Warsaw.

“They [will] try to keep these relations as long as it’s possible.”

Pressure on Berlin

As Western countries have imposed swingeing economic sanctions on Russia, China has publicly maintained its “neutrality” in the war while ramping up its trade with Moscow.

That has triggered a backlash in Europe, where some companies are already becoming wary of doing business in China because of its stringent “zero Covid” restrictions.

Pressure on Berlin is also mounting over China’s human rights record. In an open letter Wednesday, a coalition of 70 civil rights groups urged Scholz to “rethink” his trip to Beijing.

“The invitation of a German trade delegation to join your visit will be viewed as an indication that Germany is ready to deepen trade and economic links, at the cost of human rights and international law,” they wrote in the memo, published by the World Uyghur Congress. Based in Germany, the organization is run by Uyghurs raising awareness of allegations of genocide in China’s Xinjiang region.

It suggested Berlin was “loosening economic dependence on one authoritarian power, only to deepen economic dependence on another.”

In an op-ed published in a German newspaper on Wednesday, Scholz said he would use his visit to “address difficult issues,” including “respect for civil and political liberties and the rights of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang province.”

A spokesperson for the German government addressed wider criticism last week, saying at a press conference that it had no intention of “decoupling” from its most important trading partner.

“[The chancellor] has basically said again and again that he is not a friend of decoupling, or turning away, from China. But he also says: diversify and minimize risk,” the spokesperson said.

Last year, China was Germany’s biggest trading partner for the sixth year in a row, with the value of trade up over 15% from 2020, according to official statistics Chinese trade with Germany was worth a combined €245 billion ($242 billion) in 2021.

A new flashpoint

Still, the furor surrounding the Hamburg port deal is a reminder of the tradeoffs Germany has to confront if it wants to maintain close ties with such a vital export market and supplier.

A spokesperson for Hamburger Hafen und Logistik (HHLA), the company operating the port terminal, told CNN Business on Thursday that it was still negotiating the deal with Cosco.

Flach, of the ifo Center for International Economics, said the deal warranted scrutiny because “there is no reciprocity: Germany cannot invest in Chinese ports, for instance.”


A container ship from Cosco Shipping moored at the Tollerort Container Terminal owned by HHLA, in the harbor of Hamburg, Germany on Oct. 26.

However, it is easy to overstate the impact of the potential agreement, said Alexander-Nikolai Sandkamp, assistant professor of economics at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

“We’re not talking about a 25% stake in the Hamburg harbor, or even the operator of the harbor, but a 25% stake in the operator of a terminal,” he told CNN Business.

Jürgen Matthes, head of global and regional markets at the German Economic Institute, told CNN Business that critics were no longer simply weighing the business benefits of Chinese investment in the country.

“Politics and economics have to be looked at together and cannot be taken separately any longer,” he said. “When geopolitics comes into play, the view of China has very much declined and become much more negative.”

China’s recent treatment of Lithuania has also deepened concerns that Beijing “does not hesitate to simply break trade rules,” Matthes added. The small, Eastern European nation claimed last year that Beijing had erected trade barriers in retaliation for its support for Taiwan.

China has defended its downgrading of relations with Lithuania, saying it is acting in response to the European nation undermining its “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This year, after a Lithuanian official visited Taiwan, Beijing also announced sanctions against her and vowed to “suspend all forms of exchange” with her ministry.

What’s on the table

As the German delegation touched down on Friday, they were faced with another issue, which has become the single biggest headache for companies across China.

“The biggest challenge for German businesses remains China’s zero-Covid policy,” said Maximilian Butek of the German Chamber of Commerce in China.

“The restrictions are suffocating economic growth and heavily impact China’s attractiveness as a destination for foreign direct investment,” he told CNN Business.


An aerial view of the urban landscape in Shanghai on Sept. 25. The city underwent a months-long Covid lockdown earlier this year.

He said the broader restrictions were so stifling that some companies had moved their regional headquarters to other locations, such as Singapore. “Managing the whole region without being able to travel freely is almost impossible,” he added.

In a brief statement, Volkswagen told CNN Business that its CEO was attending the trip since “there have been no direct meetings for almost three years” due to the coronavirus pandemic.

“In view of the completely changed geopolitical and global economic situation, the trip to Beijing offers the opportunity for a personal exchange of views,” the automaker said.

End of a golden era?

Despite Beijing’s Covid curbs and geopolitical tensions, Germany has every economic incentive to stay close to China.

Its dependency on China can be seen across industries. While about 12% of total imports came from China last year, the country was responsible for 80% of imported laptops and 70% of mobile phones, Sandkamp said.

The automobile, chemical and electrical industries are also reliant on Chinese trade.

“If we were to stop trading with China, we would run into trouble,” Sandkamp added.

China made up 40% of Volkswagen’s worldwide deliveries in the first three quarters of this year, and it’s also the top market for other automakers such as Mercedes.

Wariness among some German officials over the country’s closeness with China could filter into a more restrictive trade policy, though economic cooperation is still in both parties’ interests.

In September, Germany’s economy minister Robert Habeck told Reuters that the government was working on a new trade policy with China to reduce dependence on Chinese raw materials, batteries and semiconductors.

Unidentified sources also told the news agency that the ministry was weighing new rules that would make business with China less attractive. The ministry did not respond to a request for comment from CNN Business.

But “despite all odds and challenges, China remains unrivaled in terms of market size and market growth opportunities for many German companies,” said Butek, of the German Chamber.

He predicted that “the large majority will stay committed to the Chinese market and is expecting to expand their business.”

Companies appear to be toeing that line. Last week, BASF CEO Martin Brudermüller was quoted in Chinese state media as saying that Germans should “step away from China-bashing and look at ourselves a bit self-critically.”

“We benefit from China’s policies of widening market access,” he said at a company event, according to state-run news agency Xinhua, pointing to the construction of a BASF chemical engineering site in southern China.

— CNN’s Simone McCarthy, Chris Stern, Lauren Kent, Nadine Schmidt, Claudia Otto and Arnaud Siad contributed to this report.

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