How Should America Deter China From Attacking Taiwan?
In “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence” (January/February 2024), Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen argue that Washington and Taiwan are not doing enough to assure Beijing of their intentions, in the process undermining deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. We agree that deterrence requires threats as well as assurances, and we support their call for strengthening Taiwanese defenses while pursuing increased cross-strait dialogue.
But the authors make several errors that together generate counterproductive policy recommendations. The first and most important error is that they claim that China, the United States, and Taiwan are caught in a so-called security dilemma. Such a scenario transpires when a defensive-minded state tries to strengthen its own security in a way that inadvertently makes another state feel less secure. That dynamic results in an escalating spiral that leaves both sides primed for war.
China and the United States may be trapped in such a vicious cycle, but China and Taiwan certainly are not. Beijing’s intentions, particularly under its leader, Xi Jinping, are clear and unequivocal: China wants to assert political control over Taiwan. Offering concessions to a determined revisionist such as Beijing will only invite further aggression. Instead, clear redlines reinforced by credible threats of unacceptable pain are needed. Taiwan does not need to assure China. It needs to show strength.
The authors also draw a false equivalence. They make the common but illogical suggestion that political moves by the United States and Taiwan—including visits by senior U.S. officials to Taiwan and rhetorical gaffes by U.S. officials who accidentally describe Taiwan as a country—are somehow as damaging to cross-strait peace as Chinese belligerence. In truth, Beijing is the actor threatening and carrying out military provocations, including large-scale offensive exercises and simulations of blockades, as well as massive air and naval intrusions.
These actions undermine and violate the agreements that frame the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Implying that the United States and Taiwan must shoulder the onus of assurance serves only to legitimize China’s preferred narrative that Beijing is blameless while others are responsible for damaging cross-strait relations. It also loses the plot. The main issue is not errant American or Taiwanese rhetoric but the mounting threat of very real Chinese violence.
Moreover, Washington has already tried an “assurance first” approach. Decades of economic, political, and even security engagement from the 1990s on failed to mollify Chinese concerns about Taiwan. Instead, these policies set the stage for a militarily powerful China that increasingly violates international security norms.
Of the three parties, China is the least constrained and the most able to renege on its commitments, and it has made the fewest binding agreements. It is therefore incumbent on Beijing to present assurances that it will follow the rules. Without those assurances, the appropriate response is punishment or ostracization. Washington could support more bilateral military coordination with Taiwan, as well as between Taiwan and other regional partners; push for further internationalization of cross-strait security issues; and further clarify that the United States demands a peaceful resolution to Taiwan’s status. Conditional, credible consequences are now essential to encouraging a less bellicose Chinese policy.
The authors’ analytic errors matter: misdiagnosing the problem can lead to inappropriate, perhaps even counterproductive, solutions. In this case, providing more assurances will simply embolden Beijing to continue its threatening behavior.
U.S. policy to date has helped avert a cross-strait conflict and by this measure is a success. But the foundations of Washington’s long-standing approach to cross-strait relations are crumbling in the face of growing Chinese military power and aggression. As a result, Washington can no longer rely on its existing policies in the hopes that what worked in the past will yield success in the future.
Where there is a security dilemma, assurances can indeed help to assuage tensions while reinforcing deterrence. But when deterrence is needed against a determined and capable rival, assurances that are not reciprocated can quickly become concessions. In the process, a policy intended to de-escalate will serve only to appease.
Raymond Kuo
Senior Political Scientist and Director of the Taiwan Policy Initiative
RAND Corporation
Michael A. Hunzeker
Associate Professor
George Mason University
Mark A. Christopher
Affiliate Professor
George Mason University
GLASER, WEISS, AND CHRISTENSEN REPLY:
Contrary to what Kuo, Hunzeker, and Christopher argue, we did not downplay the increasing threat that Beijing poses to Taiwan. Nor did we advocate an “assurance first” strategy that offers “concessions” to appease Beijing or draw a “false equivalence” in sketching the dangers posed by Beijing, Washington, and Taipei.
In fact, we opened our essay by defining the core problem in the region as Beijing’s increasing threat to Taiwan, and we underlined the importance of strengthening the United States’ and Taiwan’s military posture. We and others have offered such prescriptions in more detail elsewhere. Our article focused on the assurances that must accompany military enhancements to make deterrence more effective. To label ours an “assurance first” approach is incorrect.
We call for no concessions and instead counsel Washington to bolster the credibility of its long-standing diplomatic positions on relations across the Taiwan Strait. Kuo, Hunzeker, and Christopher seem to think these approaches were either ill advised or are now outdated. In fact, U.S. policy has been remarkably successful at keeping the peace for decades; the new military measures we think are needed for deterrence will be less effective if Beijing believes they are aimed at buttressing a unilateral assertion of independence by Taiwan or restoring formal diplomatic relations or even an alliance between the island and the United States. A moderate posture on cross-strait relations is also essential to allow the United States to establish a more dispersed and resilient military posture in the region. Asian allies and partners, such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, will likely be less willing to grant the U.S. military the increased access it needs if Washington or Taipei, rather than Beijing, are seen as undermining stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Kuo, Hunzeker, and Christopher insist that we mischaracterize the situation faced by China, Taiwan, and the United States as a security dilemma. But deterrent threats always require accompanying assurances, even with actors such as China that threaten to revise the status quo by force, since they, too, can attack out of fear. After all, security dilemmas do not exist in truly friendly, trusting relationships. The United States never needs to assure Canada because it has no reason to threaten Canada.
Our critics do not articulate how U.S. policies should change to ensure effective deterrence. Perhaps they believe the United States should make a formal defense commitment to Taiwan or recognize it diplomatically to prevent conflict. They may believe that Taiwan can safely assert permanent sovereign independence as long as there is sufficient military might in place to dissuade Beijing from attacking. If so, they are hardly alone, but we strongly disagree.
