US Indo-Pacific Allies and Partners Must Remain in the Spotlight

 In the face of an array of competing priorities, the Biden administration scored landmark achievements in its Indo-Pacific defense networks in 2023. But new challenges loom large in 2024.

Alice Nason

Date Published: February 8, 2024

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/02/08/us-indo-pacific-allies-and-partners-must-remain-in-the-spotlight/

Since entering office, the Biden administration has been unwavering in recognizing that US Indo-Pacific allies are a “force multiplier” and the country’s “greatest asset.” Administration officials promised that 2023 would be the most transformative year in US regional force posture in a generation. Though this claim faced heavy skepticism at the time, it was borne out in dramatic increases in the scale and ambition of US defense cooperation.

At the outset of 2024, this article assesses key achievements from last year and obstacles on the horizon. The US standing in the Indo-Pacific improved in 2023, buoyed not only by progress in a spate of security partnerships but also by partners’ increased willingness to collectively confront China’s destabilizing behavior in the region. With ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific only intensifying, 2024 stands to be a fraught year for US foreign policy. In the face of new pressures, the administration must keep its attention equally trained on the region in 2024.

The role of allies and partners in strategic competition with China

As strategic competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific has intensified, coalition-building efforts have ensued. Though most countries’ cooperation with China is primarily economic, China is also advancing defense partnerships in the region. President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative seeks to build a model of “indivisible security” in the region. In 2023, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted an array of bilateral exercises with Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia and regular joint patrols of the Mekong with Southeast Asian partners. Beijing sought further cooperation through arms sales and joint naval exercises–including the forthcoming sale of a frigate and a submarine to Thailand and through the multilateral exercise “Peace and Friendship 2023.”

The US Department of Defense acknowledges that it cannot confront strategic adversaries alone and that security threats are best confronted far away from US shores. Its long-standing alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand underpin all recent strategy documents. These realities are well understood by the public, with more than half of Americans thinking that US alliances with Australia (53 percent) and Japan (52 percent) make the United States more secure. The United States maintains a distinct edge over China in the strength of its regional defense partnerships. The US military conducts 120 exercises annually with partner countries in the region.

The Biden administration’s record on Asia policy in its first two years in office was mixed. Though there were certainly highlight moments for its Indo-Pacific alliances, critics argued that the administration was “struggling to act on its [Indo-Pacific] agenda with the urgency required.” Senior official diplomacy got off to a slow start in Southeast Asia and had an outsized concentration on Europe. The most glaring issue was the administration’s failure to advance a trade policy for the region to compensate for President Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Administration officials fortified traditional Indo-Pacific alliances through regular engagement and expanded force posture cooperation,  but ‘heavy lifting’ remained to advance US standing in the region more broadly.

Empowered partners for competitive advantage

In 2023, progress in US Indo-Pacific defense partnerships was substantial and more convincing than any adjacent Chinese efforts. The Biden administration succeeded in three key areas: it modernized its defense partnerships, networked partners through strategic trilateral and multilateral groupings, and empowered its allies to better provide for their national defense. The Biden administration progressed the aims of its Indo-Pacific Strategy by demonstrating closer substantive cooperation with its bilateral defense allies. Two Australia-US Ministerial Meetings led the alliance into previously “uncharted territory” in its force posture cooperation–the continued rotation of US Bomber Task Forces and the future rotational deployment of nuclear-powered submarines stand out as the most advanced efforts. The administration initiated further deployments and additional cooperation on defense technology and defense supply chains with Japan. It strengthened its commitment to the combined defense of the Republic of Korea through the Washington Declaration. The Philippines granted the United States access to four additional bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Taken together, these initiatives demonstrate a high degree of trust in partners and a long-term commitment to regional partnership.

Modernization efforts extended beyond traditional allies. The administration also made inroads in the Pacific, signing a major defense pact with Papua New Guinea. India and the United States increasingly demonstrated their alignment, expanding defense industrial cooperation and enhancing interoperability through the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem. President Biden upgraded US-Vietnam relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September, a move US officials have long pursued. Biden similarly elevated US-Indonesia relations in November. These moves expanded the regularity and sophistication of US defense cooperation in Southeast Asia.

The administration enriched trilateral and multilateral networks that will further US objectives in the region moving forward. In March, the optimal pathway to implementing the Australia, UK, and US AUKUS partnership on nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines was unveiled. If successful, this partnership will further commit the United Kingdom to the region and dramatically increase Australia’s naval capability. AUKUS advanced technologies were trialed for the first time in areas such as cyber security, electronic warfare, and information sharing. President Biden hosted Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at Camp David for a historic summit, demonstrating a previously unattainable degree of alignment. The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and Australia was also strengthened–most recently, with the expansion of trilateral defense cooperation to include unmanned aerial vehicles. In October, Japan invited Australia to join two regular command post-military exercises it holds with the United States.

The above commitments have breathed life into more coordinated US regional force posture and defense cooperation in 2024. The National Defense Authorization Act signed in December 2023 authorized $14.7 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and extended it through fiscal year 2024. However, with an enormous and growing list of defense cooperative initiatives and a limited capacity, implementation remains daunting.

Winning the competition for ideas

To be successful in strategic competition, the United States must win a competition of ideas in the Indo-Pacific. The shift in regional partners’ perceptions of the importance of the rules-based order and the risks posed by China was perhaps the Biden administration’s greatest success in 2023. Many experts lamented the administration’s heavy-handed emphasis on championing democratic values in its early months in office. This approach neglected regional dynamics and alienated prospective partners in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, many of whom are not democracies or, like the Philippines and Thailand, are experiencing democratic regression.

By framing threats to regional stability in terms of state sovereignty and freedom from coercion in 2023, the Biden administration spoke to the region in terms it understands. In 2023, key documents like the 2023 Quad Leaders’ Statement and the most recent Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation (AUSMIN) joint statement focused on “sovereignty,” “territorial integrity,” and freedom from coercion, values that are prized across the region. Shortly after, however, China violated these norms, as Chinese vessels continuously blocked, fired water cannons at, and rammed Filipino ships on resupply missions to Filipino forces at Second Thomas Shoal. China also harassed Malaysian and Vietnamese vessels in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Either due to more artful US messaging or China’s behavior, US Indo-Pacific partners vocally critiqued Chinese behavior for threatening regional peace and stability.

More frequent efforts by US partners to cooperate independent of the United States represented another critical development in 2023. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and South Korean President Yoon are engaging bilaterally on shared concerns for their strategic environment. For the first time, an Indian submarine visited Australia’s port HMAS Stirling, and Australia, Indonesia, and India conducted a trilateral sail. Most credit for this growing convergence of US coalition partners has been given to Xi Jinping’s behavior in causing regional instability. Regardless, these developments are undoubtedly beneficial for US interests.

Avoiding self-sabotage in 2024

Competing for influence in the Indo-Pacific has become a bipartisan priority in an otherwise divided US Congress. The Freedom Caucus, which exercises significant influence in the House and has been hostile to US commitments in other regions, has collectively recognized the importance of succeeding in strategic competition with China. Altogether, political factions  agree on the priority placed on Asia–the greatest question now surrounds the urgency of implementation.

Dysfunction in the US Congress throughout the year is a troubling reminder that domestic politics are the greatest determinant of US objectives in Asia. Delays in the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act left spectators concerned about the future of key enablers of US defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Both sides of the aisle are committed to a firm Asia strategy, but costly commitments far away from the mainland United States are always vulnerable to public scrutiny. US Indo-Pacific strategy hangs in the balance of the US presidential election in 2024.

Trade, already the weakest component of US engagement in Asia, is the policy area with the most tenuous prospects. Former President Trump, the probable Republican nominee, has sworn that the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the only trade-related initiative the Biden administration has advanced to the region, would be “dead on day one.” With free trade lacking support at the political level among both Democrats and Republicans, pursuing an economic agenda attractive to Indo-Pacific partners will be difficult. In 2023, the Biden administration abandoned the digital trade negotiations of both the World Trade Organization and IPEF without pursuing an alternate solution. For US ambitions of presence and influence in Asia to be realized to the fullest extent, the victor in 2024 must marry its defense cooperation with tangible economic initiatives.

The Biden administration has strengthened its Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships. To win over a region historically skeptical of US commitment, the US must continue to engage with the Indo-Pacific. Developing AUKUS advanced technologies must be one such priority. Whether Biden substantiates agreements negotiated in 2023 and produces tangible outcomes in the lead-up to his re-election will test his administration’s resolve. For the administration to sustain the hard-won momentum in its regional partnerships, it must provide the right economic levers and continue to reach out to unaligned states.

…

Alice Nason is a Research Associate in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the United States Studies Centre. She is also a Councillor at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Her research focuses on US Indo-Pacific strategy and Australian foreign and defense policy, with a focus on AUKUS and diplomatic statecraft.

Image Credit: Agenzia Nova

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/02/08/us-indo-pacific-allies-and-partners-must-remain-in-the-spotlight/

 2024 Walsh School of Foreign Service

Georgetown University

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
ICC 301 · 37th and O Streets
NW Washington, D.C. 20057

China’s ‘secret’ UAE military facility sends message to nationalists at home

 A Chinese military base in the Gulf has long been a nightmare scenario for many US officials who, for years, watched the growing ties between China and their Gulf allies with a wary eye.

Ahmed Aboudouh, The Independent

23 November 2021

© EPA

An Emirati inspects the US F-35 during the exhibition of the Dubai Airshow 2021

Now, their suspicions about China’s ambitions to establish a military footprint in the oil-rich region appear to have taken a step closer to becoming a reality.

Satellite images emerged last week suggesting that China was building a multi-storey military facility in the UAE port of Khalifa. The UAE government appeared not to be aware of the building in the terminal which was built and operated by the Chinese shipping corporation Cosco. Building work has now apparently stopped, following a warning from the US.

The UAE is one of America’s most trusted strategic allies in the Middle East. It hosts a US airbase in al-Dhafra, Abu Dhabi. Emirati soldiers fought side by side with American forces in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen and the government has purchased American weapons worth billions of dollars.

On the other hand, the UAE is one of the major oil importers to China. Oil accounts for approximately 20 per cent of China’s energy consumption, and the Gulf is China’s biggest source.

The UAE is a regional hub for Chinese investments through the Belt and Road Initiative. It is the most important trade partner in the Arab world and is responsible for 28 per cent of China’s non-oil trade with the Middle East. And, more than 200,000 Chinese citizens live and invest in the Gulf country.

Limiting its ties strictly to economic cooperations and investing in growing business markets traditionally allowed China to hedge its bets and avoid sliding into simmering geopolitical entanglements between regional rivals. Beijing “traditionally has viewed direct military involvement abroad as a last resort,” says Sophie Zinser, a fellow in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East North Africa Programmes at Chatham House.

But reports of the alleged military base in the UAE may indicate that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be ready to lock horns with the US military in the Gulf.

“As China becomes increasingly confident and ambitious about realising the Chinese dream of achieving national rejuvenation, it believes it naturally needs to pursue global power and global influence to go along with its expanding economic presence in the world,” says Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in Carnegie Institute in Beijing.

The reality of what is suspected to be a Chinese military facility in the UAE could embroil China into the region’s conflict and end its “free-riding” on the back of the US security commitments, a position the Chinese leaders are seemingly keen to avoid.

Analysts also suggest that such a construction would still illustrate China’s soft power projection abroad – a similar perception of Bejing’s logistical supply base in Djibouti. Any plan for a strategic troop deployment by China in a Gulf base would be plainly futile as it would be circled by a complex network of bigger and more sophisticated American military bases on all fronts.

But the biggest dilemma Chinese decision-makers face are domestic - arising from rocketing nationalism at home, as China’s interests grow exponentially abroad.

Netizens on social media have questioned China’s lackadaisical policy of avoiding military intervention abroad to protect Chinese citizens in the event of attacks.

In August, a blast hit a bus killing 13 Chinese nationals working on a dam project in Pakistan. Over the weekend, gunmen kidnapped five Chinese citizens near a mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Rather than targeting the regional US-led status quo, the alleged Chinese military facility would be a message designed to assuage domestic critics as President Xi Jinping prepares for a third term at the helm of the Communist Party.

“China was probably thinking: ‘America has one, America is strong, we want to look strong, therefore should have one too’ rather than ‘Let’s destroy America’,” Zinser says.

Nonetheless, reports of any Chinese military footmark in the region would rattle the US administration as it quietly battles to sway its Gulf allies to ditch billions of dollars contracts with telecom giant Huawei to provide them with 5G mobile networks.

US officials think that using the Chinese company’s equipment in the Gulf represents an immediate security risk to US military and intelligence assets in the region.

Growing ties between the Emiratis and China even threatened to put the UAE’s $23b remarkable deal to purchase 50 F-35 stealth fighter jets, the crown jewel in the US airforce, and Reaper drones, on the backburner.

The United States, under President Donald Trump, agreed to sell the warplanes after the UAE last year established ties with Israel as part of the “Abrahamic Accords.” But the Trump and Biden administrations had concerns over Abu Dhabi’s ties with Beijing and its security implications.

Last week, however, a US official announced that Washington intends to move forward with the sale but emphasised that there must be a clear understanding of what he called “Emirati obligations”.

Despite the bipartisan consensus on the urgency to block China’s security ambitions in the region, officials in the US understand that not proceeding with the sale could have significant consequences on Washington’s longstanding alliance with Abu Dhabi.

“The Biden administration, much like the Trump administration that preceded it, has made a calculated decision that not selling F-35s would merely accelerate the UAE’s tilt towards Russia and China, undermine the Abraham Accords, and result in significant losses of revenue,” says Samuel Ramani, associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

“While there are technology-sharing risks of selling F-35s to the UAE, the geopolitical risks of abrogating the agreement are viewed in the US as even larger. That’s why the F-35 sales are coming to fruition,” he adds.

The sale may also help restore the shaking trust among Gulf allies in the US’s commitment to regional security, which was exacerbated by Washington’s bigger concerns in Asia and the messy military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The perception of the US disengagement from the Middle East spurred many allies, including the UAE, to diversify their commercial and security partnerships, seeking greater ties with China, Russia, India and the EU.

The recently alleged Chinese military facility discovered in the UAE “is merely a reflection of its increasingly multipolar foreign and security policy,” Ramani suggests.

But with China, the UAE is looking for more than a commercial partner. The two countries have a lot of parallels in their national development strategies, including the long-term vision for their place in the world.

“China and the UAE have symbiotic national policy goals, including diversification of exports, upskilling their domestic workforce into the more white-collar industry, and an urge to grow increasingly prominent on the international stage,” Zinser says.

This multifaceted fast-paced cooperation will make the future sync in the security field inevitable.

“It is logical that the next foray would be in the security sphere, even if a base of this nature is a rather brazen and unexpected move,” Ramani says.

Source